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Abstract 
Learning to read is an intensive visual activity that, through perceptual learning, leads to 
changes on early visual brain areas, including the primary occipital cortex, V1. The Ebbinghaus 
illusion is known to depend on V1 functioning. Furthermore, previous studies suggest that 
children are less susceptible to this illusion than adults. Although this phenomenon has mostly 
been attributed to cognitive development, a recent study showed that it could be attributed to 
schooling, given its relation with the number of years of education in Himba people. In this 
thesis, we hypothesized that literacy, instead of schooling, is the relevant cultural variable 
influencing susceptibility to this illusion. We explored this hypothesis in two experiments. In 
Experiment 1, we examined literate, ex-illiterate and illiterate adults, matched in age and sex 
and from the same socioeconomic and cultural background. In Experiment 2, we compared two 
groups of children matched in age and cognitive development, who differed only in 
schooling/literacy: pre-literate preschoolers vs. first-grade children learning to read. 
Experiment 2 provided convergent evidence and, by comparing children and adult readers, 
allowed to examine if development influences susceptibility to this illusion. Participants 
performed a size discrimination task, where they decided which of two circles was the largest. 
In the first block, these circles where surrounded by other circles or inducers, which could have 
a congruent or incongruent size relative to the inner target circles (that is, the larger inner circle 
surrounded by large or by small inducers, respectively). In the second block, participants 
performed the same task without inducers to ensure that any difference to be found between-
groups in the block with inducers would not be due to differences in veridical size 
discrimination abilities. As expected, non-readers were less susceptible to the illusion than 
readers, which evidences the impact of learning to read in early visual processing. 
Keywords: Ebbinghaus illusion; Titchener circles; visual context integration; learning to read; 
literacy; schooling; development; culture; early visual processing; primary visual cortex; V1. 
 
 
 
 
Resumo 
Aprender a ler é uma atividade visual intensa que leva a mudanças em áreas visuais precoces, 
incluindo o córtex occipital primário, V1. A ilusão de Ebbinghaus depende do funcionamento 
de V1. Ademais, estudos prévios sugeriram que as crianças são menos suscetíveis a esta ilusão 
do que adultos. Apesar de este fenómeno ser tendencialmente atribuído ao desenvolvimento 
cognitivo, um estudo recente demonstrou que este podia ser atribuído à escolarização, uma vez 
que se observou uma relação entre os anos de escolarização em pessoas Himba e a 
suscetibilidade a esta ilusão. Nesta dissertação, hipotetizou-se que a literacia, ao invés da 
escolarização, é a variável cultural relevante que influencia a suscetibilidade. Explorou-se esta 
hipótese em duas experiências. Na Experiência 1, examinou-se adultos letrados, ex-iletrados e 
iletrados, emparelhados em sexo, idade, estatuto socioeconómico e pertencentes à mesma 
cultura. Na Experiência 2, comparou-se dois grupos de crianças, emparelhados em idade e 
desenvolvimento cognitivo, que diferiam apenas em escolarização/literacia: crianças pré-
letradas em jardins de infância e crianças do 1º ano a aprender a ler. A Experiência 2 serviu 
para fornecer convergência evidente e também permitiu examinar se o desenvolvimento 
influencia a suscetibilidade à ilusão, através da comparação entre crianças e adultos leitores. Os 
participantes desempenharam uma tarefa de discriminação de tamanho, em que tinham que 
decidir qual de dois círculos era maior. No primeiro bloco, os círculos eram rodeados por outros 
círculos, ou indutores, que podiam ter tamanho congruente ou incongruente relativamente ao 
tamanho do círculo central alvo (isto é, o círculo central maior podia estar rodeado de indutores 
grandes ou pequenos, respetivamente). No segundo bloco, os participantes desempenharam a 
mesma tarefa sem indutores para assegurar que qualquer diferença encontrada entre grupos não 
se deve a diferenças em habilidades de discriminação de tamanho verídico. Como era esperado, 
os não-leitores foram menos suscetíveis à ilusão do que os leitores, o que evidenciou o impacto 
da literacia no processamento visual precoce. 
 
 
 
 
Resumo alargado 
As diferenças culturais na cognição, nomeadamente na perceção visual, têm 
surpreendido investigadores desde o início do século passado (e.g. Luria, 1931; 1933), e 
continuam a ser estudadas hoje em dia. No entanto, o foco da investigação nesta área tende a 
ser cultura a nível macro, isto é, procura-se compreender como as caraterísticas da cultura, por 
exemplo, no que toca à maneira como as interações sociais são estabelecidas, influenciam a 
cognição de maneira geral (e.g. Varnum e col., 2010), ao invés de se focar na cultura a nível 
micro, isto é, procurar compreender como objetos culturais específicos dentro da cultura 
interagem com mecanismos neurocognitivos específicos. No entanto, estudar estas variáveis 
culturais a nível micro é importante, uma vez que diferentes objetos culturais dentro da mesma 
cultura podem ter um impacto dissociado em mecanismos cognitivos distintos, pelo que só 
através do estudo de variáveis culturais a nível micro é possível verdadeiramente compreender 
a interação entre a cultura e estes mecanismos. Na presente dissertação, estudámos como uma 
variável cultural a nível micro, a aprendizagem da leitura, influencia mecanismos 
neurocognitivos envolvidos no processamento visual precoce. 
Estudos prévios sugerem que a literacia tem impacto em áreas cerebrais visuais 
precoces, incluindo o córtex occipital primário (V1; e.g. Swed e col., 2011; 2012; 2014; Chang 
e col., 2015) através de processos de aprendizagem percetiva (i.e. a experiência extensiva na 
perceção de estímulos leva a adaptação das áreas visuais a estes estímulos encontrados 
frequentemente devido a plasticidade sináptica dependente da experiência; Gilbert & Li, 2012; 
Gilbert, Sigman & Crist, 2001; Sagi, 2011; Sasaki, Nanez & Watanabe, 2009). Por exemplo, 
demonstrou-se que os adultos letrados mostram maior ativação fMRI em V1 para estímulos de 
palavras em que certos componentes de cada letra foram apagados, comparados com estímulos 
controlo bem emparelhados em que certos componentes de cada elemento foram apagados 
(Szwed e col., 2011; 2014), e também maior ativação para letras e símbolos emparelhados com 
 
 
 
 
letras em comparação com versões rodadas das mesmas formas (Chang e col., 2015). Mais 
importante, existe também evidência que sugere que a literacia tem um impacto na força das 
conexões horizontais de longa distância entre células em V1: Szwed e col. (2012) demonstraram 
que adultos iletrados e ex-iletrados são melhores que adultos letrados numa tarefa de integração 
de contornos, que tende a ser usada para medir a força destas conexões (Gervan & Kovács, 
2010; Hadad e col., 2010). Estas mudanças decorrentes da literacia poderão ter consequências 
em outras tarefas visuais que dependem dos mesmos processos visuais precoces, como é o caso 
com o paradigma da ilusão de Ebbinghaus (i.e. o tamanho percebido de um círculo central é 
modelado por círculos adjacentes; Ebbinghaus, 1901), uma vez que esta ilusão depende do 
funcionamento de áreas visuais precoces, especificamente o córtex visual primário (V1; Chen 
e col., 2018; Schwarzkopf & Rees, 2013; Song e col., 2011), e foi sugerido também depender 
de conexões horizontais de longa distância entre células em V1 (Kovács e col., 1999; Li, Piëch 
& Gilbert, 2006).  
O possível impacto da literacia na suscetibilidade à ilusão de Ebbinghaus é apoiado por 
estudos do desenvolvimento que sugerem uma trajetória de desenvolvimento na suscetibilidade 
a esta ilusão, sendo que a suscetibilidade aumenta com a idade: crianças são menos afetadas 
pela ilusão do que adultos (Hadad, 2018; Experiência 2; Kaldy & Kovács, 2003); a magnitude 
da ilusão aumenta dos 4 aos 12 anos de idade, sendo que as maiores diferenças ocorrem entre 
os 4-5 e os 6-7 anos (Hadad, 2018; Experiência 1; Imada e col., 2013; Weintraub, 1979; 
Zannuttini, 1996); no entanto, Doherty e col. (2010) observaram que as crianças não são 
afetadas pela ilusão antes dos seis anos de idade, pelo que depois disto, a magnitude da ilusão 
começa a aumentar com a idade. Estes resultados são tendencialmente atribuídos ao papel da 
maturação, sendo que se racionalizou que a sensitividade ao contexto visual aumenta com a 
idade. No entanto, estas diferenças principalmente evidentes entre os 4-5 e os 6-7 anos poderão 
ser melhor explicadas pelo impacto de uma variável cultural a nível micro, a escolarização ou 
 
 
 
 
literacia, uma vez que é nestas idades que as crianças entram na escola e começam a aprender 
a ler. De facto, o impacto de práticas culturais nesta ilusão já foi sugerido anteriormente.  
Estudos culturais consistentemente observam que as pessoas em sociedades 
industrializadas, como os Ingleses, são mais suscetíveis a esta ilusão do que pessoas em 
sociedades não industrializadas, como os Himba da Namíbia (Bremner e col., 2016; Caparos e 
col., 2011; Davidoff, Fonteneau & Goldstein, 2008; de Fockert e col., 2007). Estas diferenças 
foram explicadas, por exemplo, com a exposição a ambientes visualmente densos. Em 
sociedades industrializadas, as ruas são marcadas por cenários com muitos elementos, o que, 
segundo Miyamoto, Nisbett e Massuda (2006) e Nisbett e Miyamoto (2005), promove um tipo 
de processamento visual holístico, isto é, em que a forma com que um elemento visual é 
percecionado está dependente do contexto em que esse elemento visual se insere. Desta forma, 
Caparos e col. (2011) hipotetizaram que a exposição a estes ambientes densos iria aumentar a 
integração do contexto visual na ilusão de Ebbinghaus. Para testar esta hipótese, investigaram 
a suscetibilidade à ilusão de Ebbinghaus com participantes ingleses, japoneses, e participantes 
Himba que estavam divididos em dois grupos: Himba urbano, que eram Himba que cresceram 
em ambientes urbanos com ambientes cheios, e Himba tradicional, que eram Himba que 
raramente, ou nunca, tinham saído das suas aldeias. Estes autores verificaram que os japoneses 
foram os mais suscetíveis à ilusão, e os Himba tradicional os menos suscetíveis, enquanto os 
Ingleses e os Himba urbano estavam no meio e não diferiram um do outro, tendo sido sugerido 
que a exposição destes Himba urbano a ambientes densos promoveu maior suscetibilidade à 
ilusão de Ebbinghaus em comparação com os Himba tradicional que cresceram em aldeias com 
ambientes não densos. Doherty e col. (2010) também sugeriram que uma variável cultural, a 
exposição a informação pictorial, estava envolvida não só na diferença na suscetibilidade à 
ilusão entre crianças de diferentes idades encontradas no seu estudo, como também nas 
diferenças entre participantes Himba e Ingleses. Segundo estes autores, as crianças precisam de 
 
 
 
 
muita experiência a interpretar 3D em imagens 2D antes de se tornarem suscetíveis à ilusão. Da 
mesma forma, os Himba seriam menos sucetíveis à ilusão porque não têm acesso a informação 
pictorial. Deve-se notar que os Himba, apesar de menos sucetíveis à ilusão, não são imunes à 
mesma, o que sugere que a exposição a informação pictorial não é necessária para desencadear 
a suscetibilidade à ilusão, ao contrário do que foi sugerido por Doherty e col. (2010), e, assim, 
esta variável poderá ter um papel moderador, mas não desencadeador, da ilusão. 
No entanto, nestes estudos culturais, adultos Himba com diversos níveis de 
escolarização (de 0 a 12 anos) foram comparados com estudantes universitários Ingleses (com 
pelo menos 12 anos de educação), e, assim, além da pertença a culturas diferentes, os dois 
grupos diferiram nos níveis de escolarização, um factor que influencia processos percetivos 
(Myamoto e col., 2006; Ventura, e col., 2008). Desta forma, a escolarização poderá estar a 
contribuir para as diferenças culturais observadas.  
Tendo isto em conta, Bremner e col. (2016) examinaram a suscetibilidade à ilusão de 
Ebbinghaus em participantes Ingleses e Himba (Tradicional e Urbano) desde os três anos até à 
idade adulta, tendo em conta os anos de escolarização e a exposição a ambientes densos. Desde 
os três aos 10 anos, os participantes Himba demonstraram a menor suscetibilidade à ilusão. As 
crianças de três a seis anos de idade demonstraram a menor suscetibilidade à ilusão, 
independentemente da cultura. Foi apenas a partir dos sete anos de idade que as diferenças 
culturais começaram a ser observadas (como já tinha sido observado num estudo que comparou 
a suscetibilidade à ilusão de Ebbinghaus em crianças Japonesas e Americanas; Imada e col., 
2013). Crianças Himba em ambientes rurais (Himba Tradicional) foram menos sucetíveis à 
ilusão do que qualquer outro grupo, e as crianças Inglesas foram as mais suscetíveis, enquanto 
os Himba Urbano estavam no meio. As diferenças na exposição a ambientes densos não foram 
o fator principal subjacente a diferenças culturais, uma vez que não se encontrou uma correlação 
significativa entre a suscetibilidade à ilusão e a exposição a ambientes urbanos. No entanto, 
 
 
 
 
mais importante, o número de anos de escolarização estava significativamente correlacionado 
com a suscetibilidade à ilusão, e a correlação manteve-se quando se controlou a exposição a 
ambientes urbanos e a idade. No entanto, estes autores não separaram os efeitos da 
escolarização de um modo geral e da literacia. No presente estudo, procurámos estudar 
especificamente o efeito da literacia na suscetibilidade à ilusão de Ebbinghaus, dadas as 
evidências já mencionadas que a literacia influencia áreas visuais precoces, como V1 (e.g. 
Szwed e col., 2011; 2012), e de que a ilusão de Ebbinghaus está dependente do funcionamento 
em V1 (e.g. Schwarzkopf & Rees, 2013). 
O papel da literacia na suscetibilidade à ilusão de Ebbinghaus foi examinado em duas 
experiências, uma com adultos e outra com crianças. Na Experiência 1, para separar os efeitos 
da escolarização e da literacia, comparámos adultos iletrados, ex-iletrados (isto é, adultos que 
aprenderam a ler na vida adulta e que não foram escolarizados) e letrados (adultos letrados e 
escolarizados), emparelhados em idade, sexo, estatuto socioeconómico e pertencentes à mesma 
cultura. Na Experiência 2, comparámos dois grupos de crianças, emprelhados em idade e 
desenvolvimento cognitivo, que diferiam apenas na escolarização/literacia: crianças pré-
letradas em jardins de infância e crianças do 1º ano escolar a aprender a ler. Evidência 
convergente nestas duas experiências permitiu testar de maneira robusta se a aprendizagem da 
leitura era, de facto, o principal responsável pelas diferenças na suscetibilidade à ilusão de 
Ebbinghaus. Ademais, a comparação entre a magnitude da ilusão para adultos e para crianças 
permitiu examinar se o desenvolvimento neuronal tem alguma influência na magnitude da 
ilusão. 
Para testar o efeito da literacia na integração do contexto visual, utilizámos uma tarefa 
de discriminação de tamanho em que os participantes tinham que decidir qual de dois círculos 
apresentados era maior. Os círculos podiam estar rodeados de indutores (bloco com indutores) 
ou apresentados isoladamente (bloco sem indutores). No bloco com indutores, utilizámos dois 
 
 
 
 
tipos de contextos: contextos congruentes, em que dois círculos centrais com diferentes 
tamanhos eram apresentados, sendo que o círculo central maior estava sempre rodeado de 
indutores grandes e o círculo central menor estava rodeado de indutores pequenos; e contextos 
incongruentes, em que o círculo central maior estava sempre rodeado de indutores pequenos e 
o círculo central menor estava rodeado de indutores grandes. O contexto congruente 
representava a ilusão de Ebbinghaus clássica, uma vez que o efeito do contexto é prejudicador, 
dado que o círculo fisicamente maior rodeado de indutores grandes iria ser subestimado e o 
círculo fisicamente menor iria ser sobrestimado. O contexto incongruente servia para apoiar a 
discriminação e tinha como objetivo verificar se, de facto, os leitores eram mais sensíveis ao 
contexto: se for este o caso, estes participantes iriam ser piores na condição de contexto 
congruente mas melhores na condição de contexto incongruente. Por último, o bloco sem 
indutores representava uma condição controlo que tinha como propósito avaliar a capacidade 
discriminação verídica dos participantes. Em ambos os blocos, a diferença de tamanho real dos 
círculos a ser comparados variava em passos de 4%, e podia ser 2%, 6%, 10%, 14% ou 18%. 
Hipotetizou-se que, em ambas as experiências, não-leitores (Experiência 1, adultos 
iletrados; Experiência 2, crianças pré-letradas) iriam ser menos suscetíveis ao contexto na 
discriminação de tamanho do que os leitores (Experiência 1, adultos ex-iletrados e letrados; 
Experiência 2, crianças do 1º ano a aprender a ler), no entanto, iriam ser tão capazes de 
desempenhar discriminação de tamanho verídica (sem indutores) como os leitores. Estas 
diferenças poderiam ser mais acentuadas em diferenças de tamanho real mais pequenas. 
Como era esperado, verificou-se que a literacia teve um efeito na suscetibilidade à ilusão 
de Ebbinghaus: não-leitores foram menos suscetíveis à ilusão de Ebbinghaus do que os leitores. 
Isto significa que adultos iletrados foram menos sensíveis ao contexto congruente em 
comparação adultos ex-iletrados e letrados na Experiência 1, e crianças pré-letradas foram 
menos sensíveis a este contexto em comparação com crianças do 1º ano a aprender a ler. Estas 
 
 
 
 
diferenças foram mais acentuadas em diferenças de tamanho menores. No que toca ao contexto 
incongruente, a literacia teve um efeito na Experiência 1, sendo que, devido à menor 
sensitividade ao contexto, adultos iletrados tiveram um pior desempenho neste contexto do que 
adultos ex-iletrados e letrados. No entanto, não se verificou um efeito de literacia na 
Experiência 2, as crianças pré-letradas não diferiram das crianças do 1º ano no contexto 
incongruente. Em ambas as experiências, os grupos nunca diferiram no que toca à 
discriminação de tamanho verídica (sem indutores). 
Isto demonstra que a literacia tem um impacto em habilidades visuais de integração do 
contexto, e, mais especificamente, no processamento visual precoces, realçando o papel de uma 
variável cultural a nível micro em moldar a experiência visual humana, através de processos de 
aprendizagem percetiva.  
Adicionalmente, os nossos resultados, de modo geral, demonstram que as diferenças em 
habilidades visuais entre culturas não devem ser atribuídas à cultura em si, mas sim a práticas 
culturais que podem levar a aprendizagem percetiva, isto é, podem levar à adaptação de 
circuitos plásticos no sistema visual para às experiências que são encontradas de maneira 
recorrente, como seria o caso durante a aprendizagem da leitura. Da mesma forma, diferenças 
entre crianças de diferentes idades podem não refletir o papel da maturação, mas sim o papel 
de práticas culturais que aparecem em diferentes idades, como é o caso com a entrada na escola 
e a aprendizagem da leitura para crianças de seis anos. 
Palavras-chave: ilusão de Ebbinghaus; círculos de Titchener; integração visual do contexto; 
aprendizagem da leitura; literacia; escolarização; desenvolvimento; cultura; processamento 
visual precoce; córtex visual primário; V1. 
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Introduction 
The Ebbinghaus illusion or Titchener circles is a perceptual1 illusion (Ebbinghaus, 
1902; Titchener, 1901), where the perceived size of a central target is influenced by the 
surrounding information2. As shown in Figure 1, when two inner circles of equal size are 
presented, the size of the inner circle tends to be underestimated when surrounded by larger 
circles or inducers and overestimated when surrounded by smaller inducers (e.g., Girgus, 
Coren, & Agdern, 1972; Massaro & Anderson, 1971). This phenomenon illustrates a very 
general finding: perception of an object is influenced by the surrounding context.  
 
Figure 1. Representation of the Ebbinghaus illusion (adapted from Titchener, 1901, p. 169) 
 
 
Ever since this illusion has caught the eye of researchers, investigation has examined the 
factors that play a role in susceptibility to it. Most research has focused on the sensorial 
properties of the stimuli (e.g., the size of and the distance between target and inducers; number 
of inducers; e.g., Jaeger & Klahs, 2015; Roberts, Harris, Yates, 2005), which has been fruitful 
 
1 In contrast to optical illusions which can be called sensory illusions (occurring at the eyes-level as the waterfall 
effect), perceptual illusions arise from misinterpretation of sensory information at the brain level (cf. Gregory, 
1968). 
2 Whereas most research on the Ebbinghaus illusion has used circles, similar effects were found with other 
geometric shapes like squares (e.g., Todorovic & Jovanovic, 2018). 
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in enlightening the cognitive mechanisms underlying this illusion, regardless of the observer.  
More important, in the previous decade, other research has focused on the role of 
psychosocial variables, such as culture at macro-level (e.g., Eastern vs. Western participants: 
Doherty, Tsuji, & Phillips, 2008; remote African Himba vs. industrialized European British 
participants: e.g., de Fockert, Davidoff, Fagot, Parron, & Goldstein, 2007), gender (e.g., 
Phillips, Chapman, & Berry, 2004; but see, Doherty, Campbell, Tsuji & Philips, 2010; Shaqiri 
et al., 2018), and development (e.g., Bremner et al., 2016; Doherty et al., 2010). The focus of 
this research has often been on culture per se and not on how culture interacts with the 
neurocognitive mechanisms of visual object processing, which we examined in this work. 
The present dissertation focused on a psychosocial, cultural variable at micro-level (that 
is, a cultural object inside culture); specifically, learning to read or literacy acquisition. This is 
a cultural invention too recent in the history of humankind to have been entrenched in the human 
genome but whose acquisition leads to deep changes in visual object processing (cf. Dehaene, 
2009; for a recent review, see, Dehaene, Cohen, Morais, & Kolinsky, 2015). In this thesis, we 
tested whether learning to read enhances the magnitude of the Ebbinghaus illusion and whether 
the influence of this cultural object is stronger than the one of cognitive development. 
 
Cognitive mechanisms of the Ebbinghaus illusion 
Far before the potential role of psychosocial variables has begun to be investigated, 
almost 40 years of research have shown that perceptual properties of the stimuli influence the 
Ebbinghaus illusion. Two cognitive mechanisms have been advanced as its locus.  
The size contrast account 
According to the size contrast theory (Massaro & Anderson, 1971), the surrounding 
inducers represent a comparison standard in the process of size judgment of the central target: 
when surrounded by larger inducers, the observer exaggerates the relative smallness of the inner 
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circle (size underestimation); when surrounded by smaller inducers, the observer exaggerates 
the relative largeness of the inner circle (size overestimation). Based on this account, the locus 
of the Ebbinghaus illusion is at high-level structures related to size comparison and inferential 
processes (Coren & Miller, 1974; de Fockert et al, 2007; Massaro & Anderson, 1971). 
Indeed, the Ebbinghaus illusion is modulated by size and number of inducers: the larger 
(or smaller) the inducers relative to the inner target, the harder would be to escape from the 
illusion (Girgus et al., 1972; Massaro & Anderson, 1971; Weintraub & Schneck, 1986). Also, 
more small inducers provide stronger evidence for the presence of size contrast, augmenting 
size overestimation (Massaro & Anderson, 1971). Furthermore, suggesting the role of high-
level information, the Ebbinghaus illusion is enhanced by figural similarity between target and 
inducers (e.g., more illusion when the inner circle is surrounded by circles than diamonds) 
possibly because the perceptual system is more likely to compare similar stimuli (Coren & 
Enns, 1993; Coren & Miller, 1974; Choplin & Medin, 1999; de Fockert et al., 2007; Deni & 
Brigner, 1997; Rose & Bressan, 2002). However, this latter research has been criticized for the 
lack of a clear definition of similarity and for confounding shape, size, and contour 
manipulation (Choplin & Medin, 1999; Rose & Bressan, 2002).  
Consistent with this account, attention has been suggested to play a role in the 
susceptibility to the Ebbinghaus illusion, which denotes the involvement of feedback processes: 
Shulman (1992) demonstrated that, when a central circle was surrounded by both large and 
small inducers, size underestimation occurred when the participant attended to the large 
inducers only, whereas there was no illusion when the participant attended to the small inducers. 
Also, Axelrod, Schwarzkopf, Gilaie-Dotan and Rees (2017) found a robust correlation between 
the magnitude of this illusion and gray matter density in the parahippocampal cortex, a high-
level brain region known to underpin topographical, visuospatial representations. 
Although size contrast mechanisms might operate at least in some conditions of the 
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Ebbinghaus illusion, the size-contrast proposal is oversimplistic and cannot explain several 
findings. For example, size and number of inducers interact with distance between the inner 
target and inducers (Girgus et al., 1972; Jaeger & Klahs, 2015) in a way not predicted by 
Massaro and Anderson’s (1971) proposal: regardless of size, increasing inducers’ distance 
causes underestimation of the target size (e.g., Roberts et al., 2005). Furthermore, Jaeger (1977, 
1978) showed that, when the inner target and the inducers were presented in sequence, the 
Ebbinghaus illusion was severely reduced: There was no longer size overestimation when the 
target was surrounded by smaller inducers but, when surrounded by larger inducers, size 
underestimation was still present, albeit heavily diminished, which suggests that size 
overestimation and underestimation are not two sides of the same coin. 
Recent studies provided further evidence that this illusion is not necessarily about size 
comparison. By adopting the flash-lag effect (FLE3), in a way that two configurations of 
inducers with different retinal (physical) size (one of large inducers, other of small inducers) 
appeared to be of the same size, Takao, Clifford and Watanabe (2019) showed that size 
distortions can indeed be induced by the FLE but they do not modulate the Ebbinghaus illusion. 
In other words, the Ebbinghaus illusion was about the retinal size of inducers and not about the 
perceived size. Also, size contrast does not seem to be even necessary for the Ebbinghaus 
illusion to occur. Cheng, Qiao, Wang and Jian (2018) found that size estimation of the target is 
modulated by context, even when it is suppressed from awareness through continuous flash 
suppression, CFS (a technique derived from binocular rivalry, Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005, where 
a stimulus presented to one eye is suppressed from conscious perception due to high-contrast 
and dynamic masking images being simultaneously presented to the other eye). Participants 
still experienced the illusion, even when not consciously aware of the presence of the inducers. 
 
3 FLE is a phenomenon about illusory misalignment of two (aligned) stimuli (Eagleman, 2000; Watanabe & Yokoi, 
2006). When a moving and a flashed stimulus are presented in spatial alignment, a compelling spatial dissociation 
between the physically given stimulus and the perceived stimulus occurs. 
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The contour interaction account 
The contour interaction theory (Jaeger, 1978; Jaeger & Klahs, 2015) suggests that the 
Ebbinghaus illusion is about low-level interactions (at cortical level) between visual contours. 
The neural representations of contextual contours, adjacent to the central target, perceptually 
attract the edges of the target, inducing size overestimation, whereas the neural representations 
of contextual contours relatively far away from the target, perceptually repel its edges, inducing 
size underestimation. Therefore, small inducers produce attraction because in a sensory-level 
topographic representation of the figure, there are interactions between these close contours, 
which diminish their separation. Likewise, the presence of more inducers imply more contours, 
and hence, stronger contour interaction effects (e.g., Roberts et al., 2005). Large inducers 
produce repulsion due to sensory interactions, with the critical interactions being those between 
representations of more distant contours (Jaeger & Klahs, 2015).  
Note that increasing the distance between large inducers and target results in a larger 
illusion (Ehrenstein & Hamada, 1995; Jaeger & Grasso, 1993; Jaeger, Klahs & Newton, 2014; 
Roberts et al., 2005), because both the nearest and the outer contours of large inducers will 
contribute to the contour interaction effect (Jaeger, 1978; Rose & Bressan, 2002; Sherman & 
Chouinard, 2016). Thus, even when the inner contours of large and of small inducers are at the 
same distance from the inner target, the inner contours of both types of inducers lead to 
attraction, but large inducers will still cause greater repulsion because their outer contours fall 
in the repulsion zone represented in Figure 2A. Therefore, as shown in Figure 2B, removing 
intermediary edges while keeping both the inner and outer contours induces size 
underestimation (due to contour repulsion), but less than when only outer contours are presented 
(Weintraub & Schnek, 1986). Further support for the contour interaction account comes from 
psychophysical studies demonstrating directly that nearby contours attract and contours at 
intermediate distances repel (e.g. Badcock & Westheimer, 1985; Bondarko & Danilova, 1999). 
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Figure 2. Different configurations of Ebbinghaus stimuli 
(A) Putative regions of repulsion in gray, surrounding an inner area of attraction 
 
(B) From left to right, the central circle is surrounded: only by inner contours; only by outer 
contours; by both inner and outer contours 
 
(C) Central circles surrounded by small inducers that gradually form a larger circle: A and B 
result in size overestimation, C and D result in size underestimation 
   
 
As aforementioned, at large distances, small inducers lead to underestimation of target 
size and not to overestimation (Girgus et al., 1972; Jaeger, 1978; Knol, Huys, Sarrazin & Jirsa, 
2015; Roberts et al., 2005). The contour interaction account (Jaeger, 1978; Jaeger & Klahs, 
2015) is able to accommodate this evidence. Furthermore, increasing the number of small 
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inducers does not systematically lead to size overestimation of the target. When the target is 
surrounded by small inducers presented at multiple distances from the center, the Ebbinghaus 
illusion (that is, target size overestimation) does not increase as it would be expected from the 
size contrast account (Massaro & Anderson, 1971); instead, it becomes weaker (in fact, null), 
because the additional contours at farther distances from the target lead to a repulsive effect 
which counteracts the attractive effect of the nearer contours (Todorovic, & Jovanovic, 2018; 
Experiment 2). When the contour of large inducers was replaced by a varied number of small 
circles in a way that those small circles gradually completed the large inducers, as shown in 
Figure 2C, the perceived size of the inner target was overestimated with few small circles at 
shorter distances (due to contour attraction) but it was underestimated when the number of small 
circles increased, completing the shape of large inducers, due to distant separations of contours 
resulting in repulsion (Jaeger & Klahs, 2015). Also, inducers of equal size as the target do not 
have an effect at near distances but lead to size underestimation at farther distances (Jaeger & 
Grasso, 1993, Roberts et al., 2005). 
Moreover, increasing visual similarity by manipulating the lightness of target and 
inducers (e.g., black target with gray inducers vs. black target with black inducers, respectively) 
or shape (e.g., hexagonal target surrounded by circles or triangles) does not lead to a larger 
Ebbinghaus illusion (Jaeger et al. 2014; Jaeger & Grasso, 1993; Roberts et al., 2005; Rose & 
Bressan, 2002), which argues against the notion that similarity facilitates size comparison, 
resulting in more illusion. The existence of verbal labels that distinguish target from inducers 
did neither exert any influence in the Ebbinghaus illusion (de Fockert et al., 2007). 
The temporal locus of the Ebbinghaus illusion 
In line with the contour interaction account (Jaeger, 1978), psychophysical evidence 
suggests that this illusion occurs early on in visual processing. Indeed, the Ebbinghaus illusion 
influences size estimation of the inner target even when observers are not aware of the inducers 
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due to CFS or backward masking (Cheng et al., 2018; Nakashima & Sugita, 2018). 
Furthermore, visual search experiments also suggested that the illusion occurs at a pre-attentive 
level (Busch & Müller, 2004): when the observer was asked to look for the largest circle, visual 
search time was faster when circles were surrounded by small inducers (in an Ebbinghaus-like 
configuration) than when no inducers were presented (control condition). This effect of context 
on search time was not modulated by the number of Ebbinghaus configurations on the display, 
which is a hallmark of parallel and pre-attentive processing (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). 
The neural locus of the Ebbinghaus illusion 
Psychophysical studies have taken advantage of the well-known functional organization 
of the visual system to infer the cortical locus of perceptual illusions (e.g., Cheng et al., 2018; 
Nakashima & Sugita, 2018; Song et al., 2011). Early structures as the retina, subcortical visual 
regions as the lateral geniculate nucleus, LGN, and the primary occipital or primary visual area, 
V1, have a large proportion of monocular neurons. In visual cortices beyond V1 and in high-
level visual areas such as the lateral occipital complex, LOC, and the ventral occipitotemporal 
cortex, vOT, almost all neurons are binocular (Hubel & Wiesel, 1962; 1968). Therefore, by 
using dichoptic presentation, it is possible to examine whether the perceived size of the target 
presented to one eye is influenced by inducers presented to the other eye. Such interocular 
effects would suggest the involvement of binocular neurons at V1 or higher visual areas. In line 
with an early neural locus, the Ebbinghaus illusion is severely reduced in dichoptic relative to 
monocular presentation (i.e., target plus inducers presented to the same eye). In contrast, the 
Ponzo illusion (Ponzo, 1911; two parallel bars of equal size appear to be of different length 
when framed by two convergent lines) was as robust in monocular as in dichoptic presentation 
(Song et al., 2011) and did not survive CFS (Cheng et al., 2018; Nakashima & Sugita, 2018). 
Whereas the Ponzo illusion is thus mediated by binocular neuronal populations and possibly 
occurs at later stages of processing, the Ebbinghaus illusion occurs early on, being mediated by 
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monocular neurons at V1 (or even earlier in the geniculostriate pathway). 
In sum, the available behavioral evidence suggests that the Ebbinghaus illusion is 
mainly dependent on interactions between contours. At the brain level, the loci seems to be the 
plexus of horizontal connections within V1 (Kaldy & Kovács, 2003; Schwarzkopf & Rees, 
2013; Schwarzkopf, Song & Rees, 2011). Neuroimaging evidence suggests the involvement of 
early cortical regions, and specifically V1, in perceived rather than in physically-veridical 
(retinal) size (e.g., Sperandio, Chouinard & Goodale., 2012) and in the Ebbinghaus illusion 
(e.g., Schwarzkopf & Rees, 2013). Indeed, the strength of the Ebbinghaus illusion correlates 
with the size of V1; the illusion is stronger in observers with smaller central V1 surface area 
(Schwarzkopf, 2015; Schwarzkopf & Rees, 2013; Schwarzkopf et al., 2011). This agrees with 
the contour interaction account given that, in smaller V1 regions, the distance between neural 
representations of contours would be smaller, and hence, connections within V1 would be more 
efficient at inducing the Ebbinghaus illusion, compared to larger V1 regions. Importantly, V1 
activation does mediate the Ebbinghaus illusion, and not objective size discrimination, given 
that the perception of size in a control condition with targets presented without inducers was 
not associated with V1 central surface area (Schwarzkopf & Rees, 2013). 
 
Horizontal connections within V1 and contour integration 
Kovács (2000) and Kaldy and Kovács (2003) proposed that horizontal cortical long-
range interactions in V1 are the ones mediating contextual effects in the Ebbinghaus illusion. 
The strength of these connections has been measured with a contour integration task (Gervan 
& Kovács, 2010; Hadad, Maurer & Lewis, 2010), in which participants are presented with 
displays like those in Figure 3 with a closed chain of collinearly aligned Gabor signals (contour) 
and a background of randomly oriented and positioned Gabor signals (noise) and asked to detect 
the contour among noise. This contour cannot be detected purely by local filters nor by neurons 
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with large receptive fields of the size of the contour; it can only be detected on the basis of long-
range interactions, like horizontal cortical long-range connections in V1 that link cells with 
similar tuning preferences (Hadad et al., 2010; Kovács, Kozma, Fehér & Benedek, 1999). 
 
Figure 3. Examples of material used in contour integration tasks (varying task difficulty) 
(A) Varying the orientation of the contour elements 
 
(B) Varying the noise density on the display 
     
(C) Varying the contour spacing between elements 
     
 
 
The direct link between the contour interaction task and the horizontal connections 
Note. The left-side images present contours that are easier to detect than those in the right-side images. 
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within V1 was demonstrated by Li, Piëch, and Gilbert (2006; see also, van Kerkoerle, Marik, 
Borgloh, & Gilbert, 2018). The strength of these connections within V1 can be measured by 
manipulating task difficulty, either through jittering of the orientation of Gabor signals that 
make up the contour (Figure 3A) or by varying the relative noise density (Figure 3B), that is, 
the ratio in spacing between average noise and contour (Gervan & Kovács, 2010; Hadad et al., 
2010). The length of these V1 connections can also be measured by augmenting spacing 
between Gabor signals that make up the contour (Kovács et al., 1999), as shown in Figure 3C.  
Using this behavioral task, it has been suggested that horizontal connections within V1 
have a protracted development until as late as 14 years of age (Hadad et al., 2010; Kovács et 
al., 1999). For example, Kovács et al. (1999; Experiment 1) manipulated the relative noise 
density in the display (while keeping contour spacing constant) in order to measure the strength 
of horizontal connections across development from five to 14 years of age and showed that 
contour detection increased along development, with the largest improvement between five to 
seven years old. The length of long-range interactions might also be limited in 5-6-year-old 
children, for whom contour integration was affected by spacing among contour elements but 
not for adults (Kovács et al., 1999; Experiment 2).   
The V1 long-range interactions, underpinning contour integration, also seem to mediate 
the contextual effects in the Ebbinghaus illusion (Kaldy & Kovács, 2003; Kovács, 2000). 
Therefore, younger children would be less susceptible to the Ebbinghaus illusion than older 
children or adults. Given the developmental trajectory found for contour integration (Kaldy & 
Kovács, 2003; Kovács et al., 1999; Hadad et al., 2010), the largest developmental differences 
in the Ebbinghaus illusion would occur between five to seven years old. 
 
The developmental trajectory of the Ebbinghaus illusion: is it really about maturation? 
Most developmental studies have suggested that the largest developmental difference 
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on the Ebbinghaus illusion occurs around seven years of age. Only Hanisch, Konczak, and 
Dohle (2001) suggested no differences in the Ebbinghaus illusion between five- and twelve 
year-olds and adults. However, these authors employed a “yes/no” paradigm that is sensitive to 
criterion changes across trials, conditions, or participants (Doherty et al., 2010; Hadad, 2018). 
Most studies have adopted more stringent designs, with tasks more resistant to criterion 
changes as the two-alternative forced choice task (e.g., which inner circle is larger; Doherty et 
al., 2010) or the size adjustment task (i.e., participants adjust the size of an isolated comparison 
circle until they reach what they believe to be the same size as the one of the inner target circle 
surrounded by inducers; Hadad, 2018, Experiment 1), and with an additional condition with no 
inducers (e.g., Doherty et al., 2010) in order to ensure that any difference between age groups 
is not mere consequence of differences in size discrimination ability. These studies have 
systematically found a pattern of results compatible with the developmental differences 
reported for contour integration (Kovács et al., 1999). More specific, four-year-old children 
were less affected by the Ebbinghaus illusion, and hence, more accurate than adults (Hadad, 
2018, Experiment 2; Kaldy & Kovács, 2003). The magnitude of the illusion seems to increase 
from 4 to 12 years of age, with the biggest differences occurring between 4-5 and 6-7 years of 
age (Hadad, 2018, Experiment 1; Imada, Carlson & Itakura, 2013; Weintraub, 1979; Zannuttini, 
1996). Only Doherty et al. (2010) found no Ebbinghaus illusion before six years of age, after 
which the magnitude of this illusion increased. 
Doherty et al. (2010) examined the Ebbinghaus illusion in 4-10 year old children and 
adults, while controlling the distance between the inner contours of smaller and larger inducers. 
This control was not usually done in previous studies and corresponds to a farther distance than 
the one often adopted with small inducers (e.g., Kaldy & Kovács, 2003; Schwarzkopf & Rees, 
2013; Shaqiri et al., 2018). In fact, the design of Doherty et al. (2010) was quite controlled. A 
two-alternative forced-choice task was adopted on which participants decided whether the left 
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or the right-side orange circle on the screen was the larger one. These circles always differed in 
physical size, from 2 to 18%, in steps of 4%. 
Three types of display were used. In two, the orange circles were surrounded by gray 
circles, and hence, were presented with inducers, which, in turn, were always the largest and 
the smallest circles in the display (as in Doherty et al., 2008, and Phillips et al., 2004). In the 
third, control display, the orange circles were presented without inducers, which allowed 
assessing fine visual size discrimination without any influence of context. In the block with 
inducers, the orange target circles were surrounded by inducers with either congruent size, that 
is, the larger orange circle surrounded by the largest gray inducers in every size difference step 
(in 80 trials), or incongruent size, that is, the smallest orange circle surrounded by the largest 
gray inducers, which only occurred in the 2% size difference (in 8 trials). 
Note that, the condition with congruent inducers represents the classical Ebbinghaus 
illusion: the effect of context is misleading, given that the physically larger inner circle 
surrounded by large inducers would be underestimated and the physically smaller inner circle 
surrounded by small inducers would be overestimated. In contrast, incongruent inducers would 
assist on (veridical) size discrimination, and hence, the context would be helpful, given that the 
larger target surrounded by the smallest inducers would be overestimated. This latter condition 
can provide further evidence on sensitivity to contextual effects. 
Doherty et al. (2010) showed that the youngest groups at test (4 and 5-year-olds) were 
not affected by context on size discrimination; they were overall as accurate on size 
discrimination with congruent as without inducers. In fact, preschoolers had the best accuracy 
in the congruent condition (on average, above 75% in contrast to the 46% accuracy of adults). 
From age six onwards, observers were caught by the Ebbinghaus illusion, with worse 
performance with congruent than without inducers. The magnitude of the illusion (comparison 
between congruent inducers and no-inducers) increased along development. Across groups, it 
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was larger when the real-size difference between the to-be-compared circles was smaller, 
suggesting that with large size differences the misleading effects of congruent inducers were 
overcome, as previously reported for adults (e.g., de Fockert et al., 2007; Doherty et al., 2008; 
Phillips et al., 2004). Note, however, that in the 2% size difference with incongruent (helpful) 
inducers, the youngest children showed the worst performance. Doherty et al. (2010) 
acknowledged that accuracy in this condition: “for adults it was then already at ceiling, but for 
4- to 6-year-olds it was near chance” (p. 717), but also claimed that the overall pattern of results 
suggests that younger children are less affected by context.   
From these results, the near chance performance of young children could be due to 
difficulties in discrimination of very small, 2% real-size difference. More important, congruent 
inducers are only deleterious for size discrimination if an observer is sensitive to context. 
However, besides immunity to context, other strategy could explain this pattern of results of 
the youngest children in such unbalanced design (eight trials of congruent inducers and only in 
the 2% size difference vs. 80 trials of incongruent inducers in all size difference steps at test). 
If young children were responding to the real size of the inducers rather than attending to the 
inner targets, then, when the large inducers surrounded the larger inner circle, they would be 
highly accurate. Such strategy would be misleading in the condition with incongruent inducers, 
where these children would perform at chance, just like the result reported. Indeed, children up 
to age six show a tendency to choose the inner circle surrounded by the larger inducers, 
regardless of the size of the inner circle (Thelen & Watt, 2010).  
Furthermore, the Ebbinghaus illusion is sensitive to response strategies modulated by 
task instructions: encouraging the observers to ignore the inducers led to less illusion in adults 
(Doherty et al., 2008). This possibility could only be discarded with a balanced design, with the 
same proportion of trials with congruent and incongruent inducers (at all size differences). 
There, a strategy based on the size of inducers would no longer be effective, given that the 
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larger target would be surrounded by small inducers in half of the trials, and hence, the overall 
performance would be at chance (close to 50%). In contrast, immunity to context would lead to 
above chance performance in this incongruent condition, and one close to that without inducers. 
Doherty et al. (2010) also found a negative correlation between general nonverbal 
intelligence, measured by the Colored Progressive Matrices of Raven (CPM; Raven, 1965), 
and overall accuracy in size discrimination in 4-10-year-olds. Along age, a complex correlation 
pattern was found: for 4-year-olds only, this correlation was positive, but between 5 and 10 
years old the correlation tended to be negative albeit non-significant. Doherty et al. (2010) 
suggested that this pattern of results reflects one of two possibilities: either the time spent 
looking at pictorial spaces (which, would play a role in the illusion) is positively correlated with 
intellectual abilities, or intellectual abilities require sensitivity to context. Neither explanation 
explains the asymmetric pattern observed for the 4 year olds relative to the other age groups. 
This correlation might reflect the role of cognitive development on context sensitivity or the 
role of another moderator variable like literacy (see Kolinsky, 2015). 
Other studies have also shown that preschool children have smaller susceptibility to 
the Ebbinghaus illusion than older children or adults (e.g., Hadad, 2018; Kaldy & Kovács, 2003; 
Zannuttini, 1996; Weintraub, 1979). However, whether preschoolers are indeed immune to or 
just less influenced by context is still unclear. In fact, the Ebbinghaus illusion has already been 
reported in 5-8 month olds (Yamazaki, Otsuka, Kanazawa, & Yamaguchi, 2010) and in most 
studies it is already evident in four-year-olds, albeit much smaller than in adults, even in a 
following study using the same method and material as Doherty et al. (2010; Bremner et al., 
2016). Regardless of disparities between developmental studies, their common denominator is 
that the largest difference in the Ebbinghaus illusion is found between preschool and school 
years (that is, between 4-5 vs. after 6 years of age; Bremner et al., 2016; Doherty et al., 2010; 
Hadad, 2018, Experiment 1; Zannuttini, 1996; Weintraub, 1979) in line with the developmental 
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trajectory found in contour integration (Kovács et al., 1999).  
Note, however, that these so-called developmental differences between preschool and 
school years could rather depend on experience-based perceptual learning, regardless of age, 
instead of neural maturation. Indeed, long-range connections within V1 have been shown to be 
highly plastic and responsive to short-term learning (Gilbert et al., 1996; Kovács et al., 1999; 
Li & Gilbert, 2002; Li, Piëch & Gilbert, 2004; 2008; McManus et al., 2011; Schwarzkopf & 
Kourtzi, 2006). Even in adults, training on contour integration led to changes in the structure of 
axonal arbors in V1 (van Kerkoerle et al., 2018). Therefore, in the present thesis, we 
hypothesized that experience-dependent, perceptual training could be the basis of, or at least 
one strong factor for, the age effects previously found in the Ebbinghaus illusion. Specifically, 
we hypothesized that a cultural micro-level variable could be an important experience-
dependent moderator on the Ebbinghaus illusion, not only between preschool and school years 
in children, but also between adults from different cultures. 
 
The influence of culture at macro-level in the Ebbinghaus illusion 
Different cultures have shown different patterns of sensitivity to visual contexts (e.g. 
Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Varnum, Grossmann, Kitayama & Nisbett, 2010). In such studies, 
culture has been considered at macro level, that is, as the set of social norms, beliefs and 
knowledge shared by a group of people. Therefore, culture has been considered in a spectrum, 
from an analytic style of processing, that is, context-independent, where a part of a stimulus is 
not influenced by the other parts, to a holistic style of processing, that is, context-dependent, 
where the perception of a part is influenced by the other parts4. Two major theories have been 
proposed to explain such cultural differences in visual processing. 
 
4 Note, however, that the terms analytic and holistic have been loosely defined and used to describe cognitive 
styles in general, even outside the visual domain. In fact, it has been suggested that individuals from one culture 
(not groups) are not consistently more analytic or more holistic across different measures, which suggests that 
these terms are not really tapping into the same phenomenon in different tasks (Na et al., 2010).  
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Social orientation hypothesis 
The social orientation hypothesis (e.g. Varnum et al., 2010) states that cultural 
differences on perception are attributed to the way those cultures endorse social interactions. 
Cultures that emphasize self-direction, autonomy and self-expression, that is, independent (or 
individualistic) cultures, such as Western, should also be more analytic in their perceptual 
habits, while cultures that emphasize harmony, relatedness and connection, that is, 
interdependent (or collectivist) cultures, such as East Asian, should be more holistic. The locus 
of this effect would be chronic differences in attention: independence focuses attention on 
objects; while interdependence prompts wide attention to context. 
In accordance with this theory, there is evidence of a more holistic, context-dependent, 
processing among interdependent cultures, such as Central European and East Asian, compared 
to more independent ones, such as Western, on the Framed Line Task (FLT5): Participants from 
interdependent cultures are more accurate in the relative task (Varnum, Grossmann, Katunar, 
Nisbett & Kitayama, 2008; Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura & Larsen, 2003). Along with those 
cross-cultural differences, differences in visual processing have also been found within-culture 
between groups that vary in social orientation, such as Hokkaido and Mainland Japanese 
(Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura & Ramaswamy, 2006), Working-class and Middle-class 
Americans (Na et al., 2010), and Farmers/Fishers and Herder communities in the Black Sea 
region of Turkey (Uskul, Kitayama & Nisbett, 2008). 
Some prior studies on the Ebbinghaus illusion seem to agree (at least partially) with this 
proposal, given that East Asian observers showed greater sensitivity to context, and hence, 
larger Ebbinghaus illusion than Westerners (Doherty et al., 2008). However, this cultural 
difference has only been found after the age of six (Imada et al., 2013). Furthermore, contrary 
 
5 In the FLT, participants are presented with a square frame in which a line is drawn. They are then shown other 
square frames of various sizes and asked to draw a line that was identical to the first line in either absolute length 
(absolute task) or in ratio relative to the surrounding frame (relative task). 
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to this proposal, British adults show larger susceptibility to the Ebbinghaus illusion than Himba 
Namibian adults (Bremner et al., 2016; Caparos, Ahmed, Bremner, de Fockert, Linnell & 
Davidoff, 2011; Davidoff, Fonteneau & Goldstein, 2008; de Fockert et al., 2007), and this 
cannot be attributed to differences in iris pigmentation (Coren & Porac, 1978). Himba are 
“seminomadic people in a remote area of northen Namibia, who have extremely limited access 
to Western technology and no formal education” (de Fockert et al., 2007, p. 738) and 
interdependent social systems (Gluckman, 1965): They live in a social community structured 
around large family compounds where roles and behavior appear to be rigidly enforced. 
According to the social orientation hypothesis (Nisbett et al., 2003) and contrary to what has 
been observed (e.g., Caparos et al., 2011; Davidoff et al., 2007; de Fockert et al., 2007) Himba 
would be more holistic and hence more susceptible to the Ebbinghaus illusion than Westerners.  
Physical environment hypothesis 
The physical environment hypothesis (e.g. Miyamoto, Nisbett & Masuda, 2006; Nisbett 
& Miyamoto, 2005) states that cultural differences found in visual perception are largely 
dependent on perceptual environments. Cultures marked by cluttered environments with 
ambiguous objects promote holistic processing because focusing on details would be 
overstimulating, whereas cultures marked by uncluttered environments with salient objects 
promote analytic processing due to focusing on few salient details.  
Indeed, in a change blindness task in which participants view two sequentially presented 
similar pictures or animated vignettes and have to detect slight changes made on focal or 
contextual elements, changes made to contextual elements were more detected when the picture 
or animated vignette was of a Japanese city (a cluttered environment) than when it was of an 
American city (a relatively less cluttered environment), regardless of cultural background. 
When the picture or animated vignette was of a culturally neutral scene, as construction sites, 
Japanese detected more changes to contextual elements than Americans, and Americans 
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detected more changes to focal elements than Japanese (Miyamoto et al., 2006). Furthermore, 
showing that this cultural influence in visual perception might be rather dependent on attention, 
and flexible, when Japanese students were primed with pictures of American cities, they 
became more analytic than Japanese who were not primed when they were presented with the 
culturally neutral scenery, and vice-versa for American students primed with Japanese cities 
(Miyamoto et al., 2006). This suggests that chronic differences in cultural patterns of attention 
caused by the perceptual environment generalize to non-cultural scenes and objects.  
It thus seems that more than philosophical or referential systems, the visual environment 
could be a critical factor for the supposedly-cultural differences in the Ebbinghaus illusion. For 
example, Jahoda and Stacey (1970) found that Ghanaian college students from less 
industrialized settings than Scottish students were less susceptible to the Ebbinghaus illusion. 
Note that Ghanaian observers came from coastal plains or the central forest belt, where there is 
a lot of open, uncluttered, space, whereas Scottish came from cities with cluttered 
environments. Caparos et al. (2011) showed that rather than the cultural referential system, the 
perceptual environment is responsible for differences in the Ebbinghaus illusion between 
Japanese, British and Himba observers. In order to test the visual clutter account, Himba 
observers varied on amount of exposition to urban environments: urban Himba lived in urban 
environments (on average, for six years); traditional Himba had reduced experience with urban 
environments (and also varied in number of visits to cities). Whereas Japanese observers were 
the most susceptible to the Ebbinghaus illusion, traditional Himba were the least susceptible. 
Interestingly, urban Himba did not differ from British observers. Note that a great deal of 
experience with cluttered environments seems necessary for modulation of visual processing, 
given that the number of times traditional Himba observers visited an urban environment was 
not correlated with the magnitude of the Ebbinghaus illusion (see also Bremner et al., 2016).  
What is clear from the physical environment hypothesis (e.g. Miyamoto et al., 2006; 
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Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005) is that experience-dependent influences, regardless of the macro 
societal frame, affect visual perception and specifically the Ebbinghaus illusion. More 
important, culture is not a cause but rather a moderator in the Ebbinghaus illusion. Indeed, 
regardless of culture, all observers were sensitive to the Ebbinghaus illusion (e.g., Himba vs 
UK adults: de Fockert et al., 2007; British and Japanese college students: Caparos et al., 2011; 
Doherty et al., 2008; Scottish and Ghanaian: Jahoda & Stacey, 1970). 
Perceptual learning: the common mechanism 
A critical aspect on the study of cultural differences is to understand the mechanism 
responsible for such cultural modulation of visual perception. In light of this, rather than 
dependent of culture in sensu stricto, visual processing could rather be influenced by perceptual 
learning (Gilbert & Li, 2012), i.e., extensive experience in perception of visual scenes or objects 
which leads to the adaptation of visual brain regions to these frequently encountered stimuli 
due to experience-dependent synaptic plasticity, regardless of such experiences being cultural 
or not (Gilbert & Li, 2012; Gilbert et al., 2001; Sagi, 2011; Sasaki et al., 2009). This results in 
more efficient and less effortful processing of these frequently experienced stimuli (Sigman, 
Pan, Yang, Stern, Silbersweig & Gilbert, 2005). In this vein, chronic differences in culture-
specific patterns of attention would lead to a perceptual bias in visual perception which would 
have occurred due to perceptual learning.  
This hints that the cultural differences in the Ebbinghaus illusion might not be due to 
culture at a macro-level, and the developmental differences might not be due to maturational 
development. Instead, we suggest that it could be that micro-level cultural variables would 
influence even the early visual processing levels that underpin the Ebbinghaus illusion (Cheng 
et al., 2018; Song et al., 2011) as consequence of experience-dependent perceptual learning.   
We are not the first to propose the importance of perceptual learning in the modulation 
of the Ebbinghaus illusion. In fact, although not explicitly stated, the physical environment 
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hypothesis (e.g. Miyamoto et al., 2006; Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005) is one about perceptual 
learning (see also e.g., Caparos et al., 2011; de Fockert et al., 2007). Furthermore, Doherty et 
al. (2010; Bremner et al., 2016) suggested that the engagement with pictorial stimuli and print 
could explain the developmental trajectories and cross-cultural differences in the Ebbinghaus 
illusion, given that the ability to compute depth and size of 3D objects represented in 2D 
pictures would require perceptual training and exposure to such pictures. Therefore, observers 
with less experience with such pictorial information would also be less susceptible to the 
Ebbinghaus illusion, as happens in young children and in adults from remote cultures. 
Taking this into account, Bremner et al. (2016) examined the Ebbinghaus illusion in 
Himba and British observers from three years of age until adulthood. Across age, from 3-10 
years old, Himba observers had lower size discrimination abilities than British observers (and 
this hold true even when no inducers were presented). Three to six year-old children showed 
the smallest illusion (computed as the difference in accuracy between the condition of 
congruent inducers and no-inducers), regardless of culture. It was only after age 7, that cultural 
differences were  observed (as previously found with Japanese vs. American children; Imada 
et al., 2013): Himba children from rural environments were overall the least susceptible to the 
Ebbinghaus illusion, and British were the most susceptible, while the Urban Namibians were 
in between. Regardless of age, rural Himba were the observers with the smallest, albeit reliable, 
illusion, even when compared with urban Himba. Interestingly, 3-5-year old Himba children 
from urban environments showed a significant (albeit small) Ebbinghaus illusion and were 
more accurate in a helpful context (incongruent inducers) relative to no-context (no inducers), 
questioning the possible immunity of young preschool children to contextual information and 
to the Ebbinghaus illusion (Doherty et al., 2010). Differences in visual clutter of the landscape 
were not the main factor underlying cultural differences, given that no significant correlation 
was found between the magnitude of the Ebbinghaus illusion and exposure to the urban 
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environment (Experiment 3). More important, number of years of schooling was significantly 
correlated with the magnitude of illusion, and this held true even after controlling for years of 
exposure to urban environment and age. 
As a matter of fact, in all studies, Himba adults with disperse schooling (from 0 to 12 
years of education) were compared to Western urban college students or academics (with at 
least 12 years of education), and hence, besides cultural referential, the two groups did differ in 
schooling, an experience-dependent factor known to influence perceptual processes (e.g., 
Myamoto et al., 2006; Ventura, Pattamadilok, Fernandes, Morais, & Kolinsky, 2008) and 
possibly the Ebbinghaus illusion (Bremner et al., 2016). Yet, besides schooling, another cultural 
object could be responsible for these results. Indeed, for most WEIRD (Western, educated, 
industrialized, rich, democratic) people (cf. Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), learning to 
read starts at school entrance. More important, it is possible do disentangle the influence of 
reading from that of schooling.  
Previous studies have shown that, regardless of schooling, learning to read can have 
deep consequences in visual processing. The strongest evidence comes from cross-sectional 
studies that examined three groups of adults matched in age, from the same cultural and 
socioeconomic milieu, but who differed in schooling and literacy: unschooled illiterate adults, 
who did not attend school nor learned to read and write but have no neurocognitive deficit that 
would have precluded literacy acquisition; unschooled ex-illiterate, who learned to read in 
adulthood; and schooled literate (e.g. Dehaene et al., 2010; Kolinsky et al., 2011; Szwed et al., 
2012). Recruiting ex-illiterate adults allows researchers to distinguish between literacy and 
schooling effects, given that they learned to read but outside school. 
 
Learning to read and the Ebbinghaus illusion 
Learning to read is a gateway to culture and education and has so deep impact in the 
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organization of the brain and mind that it goes beyond the emergence of a reading specialized 
circuitry, with the so called Visual Word Form Area, VWFA, at its heart (Dehaene & Cohen, 
2011; Dehaene et al., 2010; Dehaene-Lambertz, Monzalvo, & Dehaene, 2018). It also affects 
evolutionary older neurocognitive systems like visual object recognition (for a review, see, 
Dehaene et al., 2015). Indeed, the emergence of the reading circuitry shapes the ventral, vision-
for-perception, stream dedicated to visual object recognition (Goodale & Milner, 1992), from 
early, low-level, primary visual regions, V1, to high-level visual regions of the ventral 
occipitotemporal cortex, vOT. For example, using functional magnetic imaging, fMRI, Szwed 
et al. (2011) showed that functional activation at V1 is larger for words than for well-matched 
scrambled control items, which suggests that extensive experience with print, probably due to 
this intensive perceptual training, leads to adaptation of V1 to the shapes that compose letters 
(Chang et al., 2015; Szwed et al., 2011; Szwed, Qiao, Jobert, Dehaene & Cohen, 2014).  
According to the Neuronal Recycling Hypothesis (Dehaene, 2009), vOT regions were 
partially recycled to accommodate literacy, with spillover effects on the evolutionary-older 
function. Indeed, the impact of literacy can be found in several visual tasks outside the written 
domain (see Kolinsky, 2015) and there is considerable evidence to suggest that literacy, as 
opposed to schooling in general, plays a role in the susceptibility to the Ebbinghaus illusion. 
Cross-sectional studies with unschooled illiterate, ex-illiterate, and schooled literate 
adults have shown that learning to read enhances early visual responses in the occipital cortex, 
including in V1, to visual stimuli, not only to letter strings but also to nonlinguistic stimuli as 
horizontal checkerboards, faces, and pictures of objects (Dehaene et al., 2010). Similarly, event-
related potential (ERP) responses evoked at the 140-180 ms time-window to visual stimuli were 
also enhanced in readers (ex-illiterate and literate) relative to non-readers, as well as repetition 
suppression (that is, reduction of ERP amplitude in response to the second repeated stimuli 
relative to two different stimuli) at 100-150 ms (Pegado et al., 2014). Given that repetition 
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suppression reflects the brain’s capacity to discriminate two items (e.g. Nemrodov, Jacques, & 
Rossion, 2015; Vizioli, Rousselet, & Caldara, 2010), these results suggest that literacy 
facilitates fast discrimination of similar-looking stimuli. Second, providing direct 
psychophysical evidence for the role of learning to read in contour integration, Szwed et al. 
(2012) showed, using a visual integration task (see Figure 3), that visual integration was 
enhanced in readers, regardless of schooling, as ex-illiterate and schooled literate adults were 
better than illiterate in connecting local elements into an overall shape. No significant difference 
was found between schooled and unschooled readers, so it was learning to read that enhanced 
contour integration. 
 
The present study 
In the present thesis, we hypothesized that learning to read would enhance the 
magnitude of the Ebbinghaus illusion. The rational is that horizontal connections at V1 are the 
neural underpinning of contour integration (Li et al., 2006; van Kerkoerle et al., 2018), which 
are also proposed to mediate the contextual effects in the Ebbinghaus illusion (Kaldy & Kovács, 
2003; Schwarzkopf & Rees, 2013), and learning to read was already shown to enhance V1 
functioning (Dehaene et al., 2010) and contour integration (Swed et al., 2012). 
To control for maturation confounds, this hypothesis was examined in two experiments, 
one with adults, the other with children, with a design similar to that of Doherty et al. (2010), 
except that we adopted a balanced design, with the same number of trials in each size difference 
between the two critical circles (from 2 to 18%) in the three contexts (i.e., congruent and 
incongruent inducers in the block with inducers; no-inducers in the block without inducers) and 
all material was black to ensure that differences in lightness/color between target and inducers 
would not be involved (see Bremner et al., 2016),  
In Experiment 1, observers were unschooled illiterate, ex-illiterate, and schooled literate 
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adults, matched in age and sex and from the same socioeconomic and cultural background. In 
Experiment 2, observers were two groups of children matched in age and cognitive 
development, who differed only in schooling/literacy: pre-literate preschoolers vs. first-grade 
readers. Providing convergent evidence in these two experiments would allow to robustly test 
whether learning to read was indeed the main responsible for differences in susceptibility to the 
Ebbinghaus illusion. Also, the comparison of the magnitude of the illusion between adults and 
children allowed to examine whether neural development would indeed have any influence in 
the magnitude of the illusion. 
Based on our hypothesis, in both experiments, non-readers (Experiment 1, illiterate 
adults; Experiment 2, pre-literate children) would be less susceptible to context in size 
discrimination than readers (Experiment 1, ex-illiterate and literate adults; Experiment 2, 
beginning readers at the 1st-grade), albeit as able as readers to perform veridical size 
discrimination (without inducers). We thus expected a significant two-way interaction between 
group and context. To put it differently, illiterate (and pre-literate) would be less susceptible to 
the classical Ebbinghaus illusion, and hence, more accurate than readers in size discrimination 
of a target surrounded by congruent inducers. Likewise, denoting the smaller influence of 
context for non-readers, they would be less accurate than readers in size estimation for targets 
surrounded by incongruent inducers. Given that adults might reach accuracy at ceiling when 
size differences are large, hence, leaving no room for influences of context, the three way 
interaction between group, context, and size difference would also be significant in Experiment 
1. Thus, the influence of literacy would be stronger for smaller than larger size differences 
(Bremner et al., 2016; Doherty et al., 2010; Philips, Chapman & Berry, 2004). 
Furthermore, we also examined the association between working memory and the 
magnitude of the illusion at the individual level, given prior evidence (Coren & Porac, 1987; 
Doherty et al., 2010; de Fockert & Wu, 2009). 
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Experiment 1 
Method 
This and Experiment 2 were approved by the Deontological Committee of Faculdade 
de Psicologia, Universidade de Lisboa, and followed the international guidelines, including 
Declaration of Helsinki, and the Portuguese regulation for ethics in research in Psychology. 
Participants 
Fifty Portuguese adults from the same socioeconomic, cultural, and residential 
backgrounds were paid and participated voluntarily after they gave informed consent. They 
were recruited with the help of non-governmental agencies. According to literacy/schooling, 
participants were assigned to three groups, matched in sex, H(2, N = 50) = 3.56, p = .17, age, 
F < 1, and in general cognitive profile (F < 1, MMSE6; Portuguese version: Guerreiro et al., 
1994): 21 illiterate (2 men; Mage = 38.4 yrs, SD = 7.2), who were either not attending to or 
were at the first two weeks of alphabetization courses, before reading instruction starts; 14 
unschooled ex-illiterate (5 men; Mage = 40.9 yrs, SD = 11.5), who had already finished the 
alphabetization course and had automatic reading skills (see below); 15 schooled literate (4 
men; Mage = 38.6, SD = 12.8).  
Materials and Procedure 
Before the experimental task, participants performed ancillary tests (see Table 1). 
Ancillary tests. 
Literacy indexes. Four tests ensured that illiterate adults had no reading skills but they 
did vary on letter knowledge. More important, these indexes allowed examination, at the 
individual level, of whether and how literacy associates with susceptibility to the Ebbinghaus 
illusion (in the experimental task). 
Participants were tested on letter naming of 23 upper-case and 23 lower-case letters of 
 
6 The MMSE is sensitive to educational/literacy levels (e.g. Crum, Anthony, Bassett & Folstein, 1993). Thus, we 
used revised scores, discarding the items examining reading, writing, and arithmetic abilities. 
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the Latin alphabet (excluding k, y, and w) presented sequentially in a fixed order, differing from 
the one in the alphabet. The offline reading task comprised three lists of items (5 high-frequency 
words; 15 low-frequency words; 15 pseudowords), which participants read aloud without time 
pressure. Reading fluency was assessed with the reading fluency subtest of the Differential 
Diagnosis Dyslexia Maastricht Battery (3DM Battery, Portuguese Version; Reis et al., in 
preparation) and examined whether ex-illiterate and literate had automatic reading skills. In this 
test, participants read aloud as fast and accurate as possible a list of items presented on the 
computer screen in 30 s (per list): high-frequency words; low-frequency words; and 
pseudowords (fixed-order). Reading comprehension was assessed with the Teste de Idade de 
Leitura, TIL (Sucena & Castro, 2008). This is a paper-and-pencil test that examines sentence 
comprehension. Participates are presented with 36 incomplete sentences (arranged in two A5 
sheets, each with 18 sentences) and asked to select which of five words presented in parenthesis 
correctly completes each sentence, within 5 min. 
As shown in Table 1, illiterate adults varied on letter knowledge (from 0 to 28 letters 
correctly named) and had lower letter knowledge than ex-illiterate and literate adults 
(Bonferroni: both ps < .001). The two latter groups did not differ significantly from each other 
(p = .77). In the literacy index, computed as the summed score across all literacy measures (i.e., 
letter naming, offline reading, 3DM, and TIL-5 min), the three groups differed significantly, 
F(2, 47) = 248.00, p < .001; literate had the highest score (both ps < .001). Ex-illiterate adults 
followed in-between, with higher literacy scores than illiterate (p < .001), as shown in Table 1. 
Working memory. Participants were examined in visuospatial working memory with the 
Corsi block test (Wechsler Memory Scale, 3rd ed.; Wechsler, 1997), and in verbal 
(phonological) working memory with the Digit Span test (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 
3rd ed.; WAIS-III; Portuguese version: Wechsler, 2008). 
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Table 1 
Average performance by the three groups in the ancillary tests 
 Illiterate                     
(n = 21) 
Ex-illiterate      
(n = 14) 
Literate         
(n = 15) 
MMSE 21.86 (3.32) 27.71 (1.73) 27.73 (1.75) 
Letter Naming 14.00 (10.35) 44.64 (1.28) 45.40 (0.99) 
Reading Performance:    
Offline Reading – high 
frequency words 
0.33 (1.53) 15.00 (0) 14.87 (0.35) 
Offline Reading – low 
frequency words 
0.24 (1.09) 14.36 (1.00) 14.33 (1.50) 
Offline Reading - 
pseudowords 
0.14 (0.65) 14.36 (0.84) 14.33 (1.05) 
3DMa – high frequency 
words 
0 24.21 (9.96) 40.33 (12.26) 
3DM – low frequency 
words 
0 16.64 (8.58) 33.13 (13.14) 
3DM – pseudowords 0 15.71 (6.21) 22.87 (7.39) 
TIL-5 min 0 13.07 (6.34) 21.93 (7.06) 
Literacy Indexb 14.71 (11.78) 158.00 (29.52) 207.20 (38.18) 
Working memory:    
Visuospatial working 
memory: Corsi blocks 
8.19 (1.54) 10.79 (2.61) 11.13 (3.00) 
Verbal working 
memory: Digit Span 
6.81 (1.97) 10.00 (1.88) 9.87 (2.61) 
 
 
Note. SD in parenthesis; mean performance in all tests was computed using raw scores. 
a Reading fluency: Total items read correctly in 30 s. 
b Summed score across all literacy measures (i.e., letter naming, offline reading, 3DM, and TIL-5 min) 
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The digit span subtest comprises two blocks. In the first block, participants are asked to 
repeat the sequence of digits produced by the experimenter (direct order); in the second block, 
they are asked to produce the sequence in inverse order (from the last to the first digit produced 
by the experimenter). It comprises 16 series of digits (from two to eight) in the direct block and 
14 series in the inverse block. The test ends after two consecutive errors or after the participant 
reaches the end of the sequences. 
The Corsi blocks test is a 3D visuospatial version of the former test: a 9-cube board is 
presented and participants are asked to tap each cube in the correct order following the order 
produced by the experimenter. In the first block, the participant must produce the sequence in 
the direct (same) order as the experimenter; in the second block the participant must produce 
the sequence in the reverse order (from the last to the first cube tapped by the experimenter). 
Sequences start with a span of two cubes until eight cubes. After participant reaches the final 
sequence (16 in total, the last with eight steps) or after two consecutive errors the block ended. 
In both tests, performance was computed as the number of sequences correctly performed in 
total (in the two blocks). After the ancillary tests, participants did the experimental task. 
Experimental material and procedure. 
Three types of black circles, on a white background, were prepared with Power point 
(Microsoft): small and large inducers with diameters of 50 and 125 pixels, respectively; one 
reference circle with 100 pixels; ten comparison circles with sizes from 82 to 118 pixels in 
steps of 4 pixels. 
As illustrated in Figure 4, in the block without inducers, in each display, the reference 
and one of the comparison circles were presented at the same distance of ~4.92º from the center 
of the screen, and at the center of each one of the two 3x3 matrixes, leading to 10 different 
displays, resulting from the orthogonal manipulation of size difference (in %) between the 
reference and comparison circle (within-participants variable: 2, 6, 10, 14, 16) and whether the 
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reference circle was smaller or larger than the reference circle. For each of these 10 displays, 
two versions were created (20 displays in total): in one the reference circle was on the left side, 
in the other it was on the right. 
In the block with inducers, in each display, the two circles (reference and comparison) 
were surrounded by eight inducer circles each, whose inner contour was at the same distance 
of the contour of the inner circle regardless of inducers’ size (0.40º). For each of the 20 displays, 
two versions were created, by manipulating size congruency of the inducers and the inner circle. 
As shown in Figure 4, in the congruent (size) condition, the larger inner circle was surrounded 
by the largest inducers; in the incongruent condition, the larger inner circle was surrounded by 
the smallest inducers. These two conditions occurred equally often in the block with inducers 
and in randomized order. 
Participants performed a size judgment task, through key presses, deciding which circle 
was the larger (the one from the left or from the right) in the two blocks (with or without 
inducers) of computerized trials in a fixed order: block with inducers first. 
Before each block, participants were presented with two demonstrations in paper. 
Before the block with inducers, each demonstration comprised two inner black circles (one on 
the left, the other on the right) surrounded by eight circles each. Participants were asked to 
decide which of the two inner circles was the larger, by pointing. They were told that they 
should ignore the surrounding circles as these were irrelevant to the task. Next, they performed 
the computerized trials.  
Stimulus presentation, the sequence of events, and data collection were controlled by E-
Prime 2.0 (http://www.pstnet.com/eprime) in a laptop computer with a 21.5 × 38.3 cm screen 
(resolution: 1600 × 1024 pixels; 60 Hz refresh rate). Participants were seated at a distance of ~ 
80 cm from the screen (without head fixation). In the first block, with inducers, participants 
were presented with 12 practice trials followed by the experimental trials. Sequence of events 
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is presented in Figure 5 and was the same in practice and experimental trials, with the only 
difference that participants received feedback on their performance only in the former trials. 
 
Figure 4. Examples of the displays in the three conditions (i.e. no context; congruent; 
incongruent) 
 
No context 
 
Congruent 
 
Incongruent 
 
Note. Congruent and Incongruent were presented in a block with inducers. 
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In each trial, two fixation crosses were presented on a white background for 500 ms, at 
the location where each inner circle was presented next for 10 s or until response, whatever 
came first. Participants were asked to decide which circle was larger: the left circle, by pressing 
the “1” key with the left index-finger; or the right circle, by pressing the “2” key with the right 
index finger. After response (or 10 s), a white screen appeared during a jittered time of 500 to 
1500 ms (in steps of 250 ms), after which the next trial began. Participants performed 160 trials 
in the block with inducers: 16 in each size congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) x step of the 
size difference between reference and comparison circle (2, 6, 10, 14, 18). 
In the second block, demonstration, practice, and experimental trials, as well as 
sequence and duration of events in each computerized trial were equivalent to the first block, 
except that participants were presented with two (inner) circles without inducers. After six 
practice trials (with feedback on response), participants performed 80 experimental trials (each 
display appeared four times with order randomized: 4 x 20 displays). 
 
Figure 5. Sequence of events in experimental trials 
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Results and Discussion 
For the sake of consistency with previous studies adopting the same experimental task 
(e.g. Bremner et al., 2016; Doherty et al., 2008; Doherty et al., 2010; Philips et al., 2004), all 
analyses were run on accuracy (i.e., proportion of correct responses) instead of considering 
psychometric functions. Accuracy was analyzed using the raw scores of the proportion of 
correct responses but for the sake of clarity the results are presented here in percentages. 
We ran a mixed ANOVA on accuracy with group (illiterate; ex-illiterate; literate) as a 
between-participants variable, context (no context; congruent; incongruent) and size difference 
(in %: 2; 6; 10; 14; 18) as within-participants variables. 
The main effect of size difference was significant, F(4, 188) = 530.44, ηp2 = .92, p < 
.001, and was not modulated by group, F(8, 188) = 1.37, p = .21. As expected, the smaller the 
size difference between the reference and the comparison circles, the harder size judgments 
were. The main effect of context was also significant, F(2,94) = 369.82, ηp2 = .89, p < .001, 
denoting participants’ overall sensitivity to the surrounding information and also revealing an 
Ebbinghaus illusion. Specifically, participants had significantly worse performance in the 
incongruent than in the no-context condition, F(1, 47) = 338.18, p < .001, and better 
performance in the congruent than in the no-context condition, F(1, 47) = 105.83; p < .001. 
 
Table 2 
Mean accuracy (in %) of the three groups in each context  
 Illiterate                    Ex-illiterate     Literate          Across- Groups 
No context 90.62 (7.11) 92.57 (4.11) 92.24 (3.51) 91.65 (5.42) 
Congruent 64.99 (11.70) 57.87 (12.69) 56.27 (12.73) 60.38 (12.69) 
Incongruent 96.72 (4.90) 99.74 (0.51) 99.68 (0.71) 98.46 (3.49) 
 
The three groups did differ in sensitivity to the surrounding context, but not on veridical 
Note. SD in parenthesis. 
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size judgments or visual acuity. This was revealed by a significant Group x Context interaction, 
F(4, 188) = 3.90, ηp2 = .14, p < .01 (main effect of Group, F < 1), as shown in Table 2. 
More important, and revealing that the influence of learning to read is really about 
sensitivity to context and not size processing per se, the three-way interaction between group, 
context, and size difference was significant, F(16, 752) = 3.47, ηp2 = .13, p < .001 (Step x 
Context, F(8, 376) = 207.61, ηp2 = .82, p < .001). As we expected, the influence of context, 
including the Ebbinghaus illusion (influence of congruent context), was stronger in smaller size 
differences than in larger ones (e.g., Bremner et al., 2016; Doherty et al., 2010), where the 
influence of literacy could be better appreciated. In other words, the difference in performance 
between no context and the two context conditions (incongruent and congruent) was larger for 
the smallest size differences, where performance was not at ceiling, thus leaving room for the 
observation of contextual effects and the modulation by literacy. 
 
Figure 6. Accuracy by size difference in each condition for the three groups 
 
        Congruent                   Incongruent                 No context
 
                                         Size difference 
Note. Error bars represent the SEM - standard error of the mean. 
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As show in Figure 6, in no context, there was no effect of group, F(2, 47) = 0.66, nor 
any interaction with size difference, F = .86. All groups behave similarly, with equivalent slopes 
in performance along size difference steps.  
In the congruent context, the interaction between group and step was significant, F(8, 
188) = 3.37, p =.001, MSE = 4.198, because illiterate adults were more accurate than either ex-
illiterate or literate adults in the hardest size difference conditions, that is, in the two smallest 
differences of 2% (Step 1), F(1, 47) = 6.53; p = .014, g7 = .79, and F(1,47) = 6.092, p = .017, g 
= .73, respectively, and 6% (Step 2), F(1,47) = 5.25; p = .027, g = .82, and F(1,47) = 6.89, p = 
.012, g = .90. No significant difference was found between ex-illiterate and literate at any step, 
including at the smallest: all Fs < 1.  
Interestingly, whereas at the 6% size difference, the two groups of readers still had a 
performance significantly below chance, denoting an Ebbinghaus illusion (ex-illiterate and 
literate: t(13) = -2.70 and t(14) = -3.06, both ps  .018), the illiterate group did not show an 
illusion, as their performance did not differ from chance, t(20) < 1, p = .86. In other words, at 
Step 2, illiterate adults reached the point of subjective equality, PSE, also called non-
discrimination point or point of non-discrimination  (i.e., the point along size difference at 
which the participants respond at random because they did not significantly detect a difference 
between the two target circles). In contrast, for readers, regardless of schooling, the illusion was 
still present, hindering their performance. No group difference was found at larger size 
differences in the congruent context.  
In the incongruent condition, the overall pattern of difference between groups was 
reversed (Group x Size difference, F(8, 188) = 2.52, p = .017). To put it differently, illiterate 
were now less accurate than the two groups of readers, but only robustly at the 2% difference 
(Step 1), F(2, 47) = 4.19, p = .02, tended towards significance at Step 2, F(2, 47) = 2.55, p = 
 
7 Effect sizes were calculated using Hedges’ g (Hedges, 1981). 
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.089, but not at Step 3, F = 1.73, p = .19, or at any larger size difference. As shown in Figure 6, 
illiterate were less accurate than ex-illiterate and literate at Step 1, F(1,47) = 6.35, p = .015, g 
= .74, and F(1,47) = 5.438, p = .024, g = .67, respectively. Again, this is a matter of learning to 
read regardless of schooling as ex-illiterate and literate did not differ at any step (for Step 1, 
F(1, 47) = .05, p = .83). In other words, non-readers were less sensitive to adjacent information 
either for better or for worse. Illiterate adults showed a disadvantage over the literate groups in 
incongruent contexts at the smallest size difference, on which the target size would be positively 
affected by the presence of inducers, but showed an advantage in congruent contexts, on which 
the size illusion is enhanced, hindering performance. 
To better appreciate the modulation by literacy on sensitivity to context in size 
judgments, we next computed the difference between performance in the context and no 
context, thus removing from the data the role of veridical size discrimination and visual acuity. 
Note that positive values indicate that context impairs discrimination (that is, signal an 
Ebbinghaus illusion), whereas negative values indicate that context enhances size 
discrimination. 
As illustrated in Figure 7, the illusion is indeed stronger in smaller real-size differences 
in congruent contexts. However, this does not mean that the illusion stops hindering size 
discrimination at larger real-size differences. In fact, the magnitude of the illusion at each size 
difference was significant for all groups (compared to a null illusion, all ts > 2.00, ps < .05). 
Therefore, even at larger real-size differences between the two circles, the presence of 
congruent inducers still influenced size discrimination. In the same vein, in the incongruent 
context, size discrimination was influenced by the presence of inducers, which was stronger at 
the smaller than larger real-size differences. Yet, this time and in line with prior evidence (e.g., 
Bremner et al., 2016; Doherty et al., 2008; Doherty et al., 2010; Philips et al., 2004), size 
discrimination was enhanced by the presence of incongruent inducers. 
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As shown in Figure 7, incongruent contexts significantly enhanced size discrimination 
at the smallest size difference of 2 and 6% (compared to a null illusion: all ts < -3.00, ps < .001, 
for all groups). However, in step 3, the enhancing context influenced the ex-illiterate, t(13) = -
2.69, p = .02, but not the literate, t(14) = -1.15, p = .27, or the illiterate, t(20) = -.55, p = .59.  
 
Figure 7. Mean illusion magnitude (in percentage) for each size difference in adults  
    
 
Note. Top graph represents magnitude in the congruent context, bottom graph represents magnitude in the 
incongruent context. 
*  p < .05 against a null illusion.  
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Also, in contrast to what was found in congruent contexts, an incongruent context had 
no effect at the larger size differences (all ts < 1.50, ps > .1). This suggests that, at larger real-
size differences, participants are not sensitive to the enhancing (incongruent) context. Note that 
this pattern of results, which differs from the one found in the congruent context, indicates that 
the two conditions (congruent and incongruent) are not two sides of the same coin, as previously 
argued by Schwarzkopf and Rees (2013).  
The most important contribution of the present experiment is that, regardless of 
schooling or age at which literacy was acquired, learning to read does seem to play a significant 
role in the susceptibility to the surrounding information during visual size discrimination. The 
smaller susceptibility to the surrounding context by non-readers was found both when context 
enhanced as when it hindered performance. Indeed, illiterate adults had worse size 
discrimination than the two groups of readers in incongruent contexts, especially when the 
display potentiated the role of context, that is, when the real-size difference between the two 
circles was small. In contrast, illiterate adults had better performance in congruent contexts, 
that is, in the classical Ebbinghaus Illusion, when the illusion is strongest (i.e., at smaller size 
differences). The latter condition thus revealed a paradoxical result: unschooled illiterate adults 
were better at size judgments than literate adults in congruent contexts. 
The magnitude of the sensitivity to both contexts varied with literacy score in a clear 
way. As shown in Figure 8, higher literacy was accompanied by more sensitivity to context.  
Indeed, whereas veridical size discrimination (without inducers) was neither correlated 
with literacy or working memory, all rs(49) < .26, ps > .07, the magnitude of the Ebbinghaus 
illusion (difference between congruent and no inducers), which is independent from visual 
acuity and fine spatial discrimination abilities, was significantly correlated with both literacy 
and working memory: with the literacy index (i.e., summed score across all literacy measures), 
r = .37, p = .009, the digit span, r = .32, p = .022, the corsi block score, r = .30, p = .033. 
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Figure 8. Scatterplots of the relations between magnitude of the sensitivity to both contexts and 
literacy index score  
 
                             Congruent Context                                             Incongruent Context 
      
 
Note. Bands represent a 95% confidence interval. 
 
More important, reinforcing the major role of reading in the Ebbinghaus illusion, when 
we controlled for differences in general cognitive functioning by partialling out the MMSE 
scores, only the correlation with literacy survived: r = .28, p = .05, but neither the correlation 
with digit span or corsi block scores (both rs < .24, p > .10). Therefore, these latter correlations 
were probably due to general cognitive functioning. Furthermore, the impact of literacy is really 
about the influence of context, regardless of helping or hindering performance, as the same 
correlation pattern was found, after controlling for general cognitive functioning, between the 
magnitude of context effects by incongruent inducers and literacy, r = -.28, p = .05 (with digit 
span: r = .06, p = .68; with corsi block: r = -.13, p = .36). 
The present results are consequential in two aspects. First, to the best of our knowledge 
they are the first to show that such micro cultural object as literacy can influence the Ebbinghaus 
illusion, in line with previous findings on the impact that learning to read has on visual 
processing (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2010; Kolinsky et al., 2011; Pegado et al., 2014; Szwed et al., 
2012). Second, these results also question the nature of cultural and developmental differences 
previously reported in the Ebbinghaus illusion.  
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Regarding cultural effects, previous studies that compared people from western 
educated industrialized and developed societies, WEIRD (cf. Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan, 
2010), with those from rural, unschooled ones, as the Himba (Caparos et al., 2011; Davidoff et 
al., 2008; de Fockert et al., 2007), on the susceptibility to the Ebbinghaus illusion might have 
actually been due in part to differences in reading abilities. Of course, these cross-cultural 
differences are not solely due to literacy acquisition, in fact, the effect size for the differences 
between our groups of illiterate and ex-illiterate adults (calculated using Cohen’s d; d = .58) 
was smaller than the effect size found for some cross-cultural differences in adults, such as 
those between Urban Namibians and British (d = 1.77; Bremner et al., 2016). Still, learning to 
read is a relevant micro-level cultural variable that contributes to differences in the Ebbinghaus 
illusion. 
Our participants shared the same cultural referential, lived in the same environment, and 
hence, the differences found here between readers and non-readers cannot be attributed to 
cultural differences at macro level or in exposure to different cluttered environments (e.g. De 
Fockert et al., 2007; Doherty et al., 2008). Furthermore, differences in exposure to pictures also 
seem unlikely, given that all three groups were from the same residential backgrounds, and 
most illiterate were entering the same alphabetization courses as those that ex-illiterate had 
already finished. Therefore, the present results seem to depend on the acquisition of literacy.  
Our results also have implications for previous cultural studies that have shown that 
cultural differences at macro level (e.g., Himba vs British; Japanese vs Americans) start to 
emerge exactly at the age where children usually enter school and start learning to read 
(Bremner et al., 2016; Imada et al., 2013; Köster, Itakura, Yovsi & Kärtner., 2018). Given the 
strong correlation between reading skills and schooling (i.e. people with more schooling tend 
to be more fluent readers), literacy, instead of schooling in general, could have been the real 
factor behind the correlation found between schooling and the Ebbinghaus illusion in Himba 
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participants (Bremner et al., 2016; Experiment 3).  
The present pattern of results also questions whether the developmental changes found 
between preschool and schooled years in the Ebinghaus illusion (e.g., Doherty et al., 2010; 
Hadad, 2018; Weintraub, 1979; Zannuttini, 1996) are indeed a reflection (or at least mainly) of 
maturation and cognitive development. To examine whether learning to read is indeed critical 
for the changes found in the Ebbinghaus illusion between preschool and school years, in 
Experiment 2, we examined pre-literate and first-grade children that were matched in age, sex, 
sociocultural and economic environment, and cognitive development, but who differed only in 
schooling and literacy. 
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Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-nine Portuguese six-year-old children, without known history of developmental 
and/or neurological disorders, participated voluntarily after parents gave written informed 
consent. Given that, in Portugal, children enter primary school (when literacy instruction starts) 
between five and seven years old, we selected two groups matched in sex, X2(1) < 1, p = .42, 
age, t(37) < 1, p = .98, and in several cognitive abilities (see below and Table 4). They only 
differed in literacy/schooling: 19 pre-literate preschoolers (7 boys; Mage = 76.10 months, SD 
= 0.86) and 20 first graders (5 boys; Mage = 76.10 months, SD = 0.85). 
 
Materials and Procedure 
Ancillary tests. 
Before the experimental task, children were assessed in five domains, using a similar 
rational as in Experiment 1: (i) nonverbal intelligence (Colored Progressive Matrices of Raven, 
CPM, Portuguese Version; Simões, 2000); (ii) verbal intelligence indexed by the vocabulary 
subtest of the Wechsler scales for children (i.e., Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of 
Intelligence, 3rd ed.; Wechsler, 2002, Portuguese version: Simões et al., 2003); (iii) verbal 
working memory (digit span subtest of WAIS-III, Portuguese version: Wechsler, 2008); (iv) 
visuospatial working memory (Corsi blocks test from the Wechsler Memory Scale, 3rd ed.; 
Wechsler, 1997); (v) letter knowledge (letter naming). These latter three tests were the same as 
those used in Experiment 1. 
We ensured that none of the preschoolers was able to decode any word or pseudoword, 
but varied on letter knowledge (from 2 to 43 letters correctly named). Therefore, we also 
computed the literacy index presented in Experiment 1, but here for preschoolers and for first 
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graders (i.e., the summed score for letter knowledge and the reading tasks described below). 
Reading skills were fully assessed in first graders. They performed an offline reading 
aloud task of six words (i.e., vaca, cola, nariz, mesa, amiga, anexo) and six pseudowords (i.e., 
cau, vapa, pesta, benino, tavalo, jalada) without time limit. We also examined whether they 
already showed automatic reading skills with the reading fluency subtest of 3DM (Reis et al., 
in preparation). As shown in Table 3, first graders had already some ability to decode but very 
insipient reading fluency. Reading comprehension was assessed with TIL (Sucena & Castro, 
2008), but given that only one first grader had a score above zero (able to correctly perform 
seven items in the allotted time of 5 min), this test was not considered. Therefore, these first 
graders were at the very beginning of literacy acquisition. This allowed us to examine whether 
size discrimination and specifically the Ebbinghaus illusion was influenced by reading skills, 
even if insipient, under a schooling context (first graders were already able to read aloud some 
items of the offline reading task). As shown in Table 3, the two groups differed in letter 
knowledge: first graders correctly named more letters than preschoolers (besides having reading 
skills); consequently, the groups also differed in the literacy index. 
More important, the two groups were well matched in cognitive development (besides 
age and sex). As shown in Table 3, they did not differ in nonverbal or verbal intelligence nor 
in working memory, either visuospatial or phonological. 
Experimental material and procedure. 
The same as in Experiment 1, except that here it was the experimenter (and not the 
participant) that pressed the response keys which corresponded to the circle chosen by the child 
by pointing to ensure that children were focused on the experiment throughout the session. 
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Table 3 
Average Performance in the Ancillary Tests for preschoolers and first graders 
 Preschoolers   
(n = 19) 
First graders 
(n = 20) 
Group comparison, 
t(37)  
Nonverbal IQ: CPM (out of 36) 20.95 (4.73) 18.70 (4.91) t(37) = -1.45, p = .15 
Verbal IQ: Vocabulary 25.11 (4.18) 25.00 (5.40) t < 1 
Visuospatial working memory: 
Corsi blocks 
9.32 (2.45) 9.95 (2.39) t < 1 
Phonological  working 
memory: Digit span 
8.42 (1.61) 8.50 (1.64) t < 1 
Letter naming (out of 46) 19.79 (13.11) 33.45 (11.20) t(37) = 3.50, p = .001 
Reading     
Offline task (12 items)  0 4.60 (3.57)  
3DM, high-frequency words 0 2.10 (3.02)  
3DM, low-frequency words 0 1.70 (2.47)  
3DM, pseudowords 0 1.65 (2.60)  
Literacy index  19.79 (13.11) 43.50 (20.42) t(37) = 4.29, p < .001 
Note. SD in parentheses; performance in all tests was computed as total of correct responses. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
Like in Experiment 1 with adults, the results of children revealed the influence of 
literacy in sensitivity to the surrounding context during visual size discrimination. In the mixed 
ANOVA run on raw scores (total correct responses) with group (preschoolers; first graders: 
between-participants), context (no context; congruent; incongruent) and size difference (2; 6; 
10; 14, 18) as within-participants variables, as hypothesized, the interaction between group and 
context was significant, F(2, 74) = 3.31, p = .042, ηp2 = .082, MSE = 28.03 (main effect of 
group, F(1, 37) = 3.41, p = .09, MSE = 22.34). 
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Table 4 
Mean accuracy (in %) of the two groups in each context 
 First graders                 Pre schoolers     Across-groups 
No Context 84.48 (7.35) 84.89 (6.81) 52.08 (22.13) 
Congruent 45.01 (19.12) 59.52 (23.10) 90.92 (10.59) 
Incongruent 91.49 (11.92) 90.32 (9.28) 84.68 (7.00) 
 
As shown in Table 4, when the circles had no surroundings (i.e., no context), 
preschoolers were as able as first graders to perform veridical size judgments, F < 1. In contrast, 
pre-literate preschoolers were significantly better than first graders in size discrimination when 
the circles were surrounded by congruent inducers, F(1, 37) = 4.58, p = .039, MSE = 57.21. In 
other words, the two groups significantly differed in the susceptibility to the Ebbinghaus 
illusion, which was larger for readers than non-readers, F(1, 37) = 4.21, p = .047, MSE = 29.44. 
Yet, both showed an illusion: lower accuracy (across size difference) in congruent than in no 
context, for preschoolers, F(1, 37) = 26.63, and first graders, F(1, 37) = 67.81, both ps < .001. 
Note that preschoolers and first graders did not differ on performance in the no context 
condition and neither in sex, chronological age, or cognitive development (i.e. they did not 
differ in nonverbal or verbal intelligence, or in phonological or visuospatial working memory 
measure, see Table 3). Therefore, the difference on susceptibility to the Ebbinghaus illusion 
reported here is most likely due to learning to read. The role of schooling in general cannot, of 
course, be discarded. However, based on our results in Experiment 1, it is clear that literacy 
plays a bigger role than schooling in the influence of context in visual size judgments and 
specifically in the susceptibility to the Ebbinghaus illusion. Unschooled ex-illiterate and 
schooled literate adults showed virtually the same pattern of results in Experiment 1, both 
differing from unschooled illiterate.  
 
Note. SD in parenthesis. 
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The Ebbinghaus illusion is revealed by a performance significantly below chance (50%, 
that is of 8 out of 16 correct responses), which would depend not only on the presence of 
inducers but also on the size difference between the two target circles. Indeed, as in Experiment 
1, the main effects of context and size difference were significant, F(2, 74) = 76.67, and = 
162.69, ηp2 = .674 and = .815, MSE = 0.109 and = 0.012, both ps < .001, as well as their 
interaction, F(8, 296) = 32.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .471, MSE = 0.011. 
Note that preschoolers and first graders did not differ in the incongruent context, F < 1, 
and both showed an advantage on size judgments in the incongruent than in no context: 
preschoolers, F(1, 37) = 4.82, p = .034; first graders, F(1, 37) = 8.34, p = .006. In line with 
previous evidence (e.g., Bremner et al., 2016; Doherty et al., 2008,  2010) and the results of 
Experiment 1, observers seem to be more sensitive to an impairing (congruent) context than to 
an enhancing (incongruent) one in size discrimination (Doherty et al., 2010). 
Note that, in Experiment 1, the influence of a misleading (congruent) context was found 
across all steps, even at the larger ones, whereas the influence of an helpful (incongruent) 
context was limited to a 2 and 6% size difference. However, this difference could be attributed 
to ceiling effects at the larger size difference in the former context, which would have left less 
room for a visible impact of both the surrounding information and of literacy in size 
discrimination. Noteworthy, in contrast to adults (Experiment 1), where ceiling was reached, 
that is, accuracy did not differ from 100%, at 10% size difference for the incongruent context 
and at 18% size difference for the no context (see Figure 7), in children, accuracy was 
significantly below ceiling, that is, of 100% (score of 16), at any size difference, including the 
larger ones, in both incongruent and no context (across size difference, for preschoolers and 
first graders, in incongruent context: 90.32 and 91.49%, SD = 9.28 and 11.92, respectively; in 
no context: 84.89 and 84.48%, SD = 6.81 and 7.35, respectively, all ts < -2.66, p  .015) and 
still, for children, the impact of an enhancing (incongruent) context relative to no context was 
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found only at the 2 and 6% size difference, F(1, 37) = 62.26 and = 11.90, both ps < .0001, not 
at larger size differences (from 10 to 18%, Fs  2.68, p  .11). In contrast, the presence of 
congruent (impairing) inducers led to worse performance than no inducers in size 
discrimination by children at every size difference, including the larger ones, all F(1, 37)  
25.70, ps < .0001. This pattern of results clearly shows that the asymmetric impact of congruent 
vs. incongruent context in size discrimination is not a mere consequence of ceiling effects in 
the latter context but rather because these contexts are not two sides of the same coin. This 
result also reflects the idea that contextual effects depend on the interaction between size of 
inducers and the target, probably due to the complex pattern generated by contour interaction 
when size is congruent or incongruent (e.g., Jaeger, 1978; 2015). Furthermore, the fact that 
children did not reach a ceiling performance in no context even at the larger size difference (as 
aforementioned), in contrast to adults, also suggests that veridical size discrimination might not 
have completely matured until the age of six. 
In contrast to Experiment 1, the three-way interaction was not reliable (Group x Size 
difference, F < 1). We nonetheless decomposed it for five reasons. First, based on prior 
evidence (e.g., Bremmer et al., 2016; Doherty et al., 2008, 2010) and on the results of 
Experiment 1, the Ebbinghaus illusion is usually stronger at smaller than larger size differences. 
Second, we had an a priori hypothesis that larger differences would be found between groups 
at the smallest size differences, where the influence of literacy in the Ebbinghaus illusion would 
have enough space to be robust. Third, in the present experiment we did find an overall impact 
of learning to read in the Ebbinghaus illusion, as denoted by the robust interaction between 
group and context. Fourth, another way of checking the impact of learning to read in the 
Ebbinghaus illusion is to examine the location of the PSE in each group, that is, the point at 
which readers and non-readers are no longer tricked by the presence of inducers (that is, the 
point at they no longer have a performance significantly below chance). Finally, the results of 
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Experiment 1 with illiterate, ex-illiterate and literate adults were clear cut on this evidence: the 
impact of learning to read was mainly found at the smaller size differences. 
As expected (see Figure 9), the main effect of size difference was significant in all 
contexts: size discrimination was harder the smaller the size difference between the target 
circles in any context: none, F(4, 148) = 115.27, MSE = 1.72; congruent, F(4, 148) = 86.81, 
MSE = 5.32; and incongruent, F(4, 148) = 6.24, MSE = 1.59, all ps  .0001. In no context, the 
interaction between group and size difference was not significant, F < 1, because literacy did 
not impact veridical size judgments (when no surrounding information was available). We next 
checked whether, just like we found in Experiment 1, literacy influenced the Ebbinghaus 
illusion mainly at the small size differences in the congruent and incongruent contexts.  
In the congruent context, similarly to the results of Experiment 1, preschoolers were 
more accurate than first graders at 2 and 6% size difference, F(1, 37) = 5.05, p = .030, MSE = 
11.53 and F(1, 37) = 4.36, p = .044, MSE = 15.45, but this difference only tended towards 
significance at 10% difference, F(1, 37) = 3.02, p = .090, MSE = 17.78, and the groups no 
longer significantly differed at 14 and 18% size difference, F(1, 37) < 2.60, p > .11. This clearly 
shows the larger impact of learning to read in the Ebbinghaus illusion at smaller size 
differences. Furthermore, whereas at the 6% size difference first graders had a performance 
significantly below chance, denoting an Ebbinghaus illusion, t(19) = -3.72, p = .001, pre-literate 
preschoolers did not show an illusion, as their performance did not differ from chance, t(18) < 
1, p = .67. In other words, at Step 2, that is, 6% size difference, the pre-literate children reached 
the PSE, whereas for first graders the illusion was still present, hindering their performance. It 
thus took less for non-readers to break from the illusion than readers.  
In contrast to what was found in the congruent context, in the incongruent (helpful) 
context there was no difference between groups even at the smallest, 2%, size difference, F(1, 
37) = 2.48, p = .12, MSE = 1.40 (at other size differences, Fs < 1). 
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Figure 9. Accuracy in each size difference for first graders and preschoolers 
 
                         Congruent                   Incongruent                   No context 
 
                                                 Size difference 
 
 
To further investigate the effects of literacy on context sensitivity, as well as the 
asymmetry between congruent and incongruent contexts, we computed the magnitude of 
contextual effects in the congruent and incongruent contexts relative to no context for first 
graders and preschoolers, as we did in Experiment 1. As illustrated in Figure 10, the illusion 
was once again stronger in smaller size differences in congruent contexts. Even so, a misleading 
context influenced size discrimination at all size differences (when compared against a null 
illusion: all ts > 2.90, ps < .01). 
As shown in Figure 10, like in Experiment 1, there was an asymmetry in the influence 
of context between congruent and incongruent surroundings. In incongruent contexts there was 
consistently smaller (helpful) impact of surrounding than in congruent (misleading) contexts, 
Note. Error bars represent the SEM - standard error of the mean. 
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where an Ebbinghaus illusion occurred. In the incongruent context, sensitivity was stronger at 
smaller size differences. 
 
Figure 10. Mean illusion magnitude (in percentage) for each size difference in children 
 
                                                  Congruent context 
 
                                      Incongruent context 
Note. Top graph represents magnitude in the congruent context (magnitude of the Ebbinghaus illusion), bottom 
graph represents magnitude in the incongruent context. 
*  p < .01 against a null illusion. 
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For preschoolers, size discrimination was affected by the helpful context at 2 and 6% 
size differences, t(18) = -4.42, p < .001, and t(18) = -2.90, p < .01, respectively. First graders 
were influenced by the helpful context at 2% size difference, t(19) = -5.90, p < .001, but only 
marginally at 6% size difference, t(19) = -2.04, p = .06. Neither group was influenced by context 
at the 10 and 14% size differences (all ts > -1.1, ps < .3). At the 18% size difference, the 
incongruent context significantly impaired size discrimination by preschoolers, t(19) = 2.14, p 
= .05 and had no effect for first graders, t(18) = .75, p = .46. This shows once again that the 
incongruent context has no effect at larger size differences.  
Finally, we examined whether reading and other cognitive abilities were correlated with 
the Ebbinghaus illusion and sensitivity to the context, considering the literacy index, 
phonological and visuospatial working memory (digit span and corsi blocks test, respectively), 
and nonverbal and verbal intelligence (CMP and vocabulary scores). In contrast to what was 
found in Experiment 1, veridical size judgments (no context) were significantly correlated with 
visuospatial abilities, that is, with visuospatial working memory (corsi blocks score) and 
nonverbal intelligence (CPM), r(37) = .49 and r(37) = .52, respectively, ps < .005. In what 
regards the literacy index and the vocabulary score, no significant correlation with veridical 
size judgment was found, r(37) = -.04, and r(37) = -24, respectively, both ps > .15. 
In what regards the magnitude of contextual effects in congruent (misleading) and 
incongruent (helpful) contexts, no significant correlation was found for neither congruent (all 
rs < .23, ps > .15) nor incongruent contexts (all rs > -.15, ps > .35). Partial correlations were 
also unreliable, all ps > .13. 
It might, however, be the case that the correlation between literacy/schooling and the 
Ebbinghaus illusion was reliable at the smaller size differences, where there was enough room 
to find a moderator role of literacy in sensitivity to context, that is, at the 6% size difference. 
Note that, as aforementioned, it was at this size difference that the differences between groups 
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were the largest (see Figure 10). Indeed, at 6% size difference, the better the children’s literacy 
skills the larger the Ebbinghaus illusion, r = .33, p < .05 (see Figure 11), which, in turn, was 
not significantly correlated with any other cognitive ability, all rs < .27, ps > .09.  
 
Figure 11. Scatterplot of the relation between magnitude of the sensitivity to the congruent 
context at 6% size difference and literacy index score  
 
 
Note. Bands represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
The present experiment provided further evidence for the role of literacy in the 
susceptibility to the Ebbinghaus illusion: pre-literate preschoolers were less susceptible to a 
misleading impairing (congruent) context than first graders who were just beginning readers. 
Given our strict control in cognitive abilities and age, neural maturation cannot be responsible 
for the difference found between the two child groups examined here, who were from close 
neighborhoods, from the same city and from the same socioeconomic and cultural background. 
The similarities between the results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that it is not exposure to 
pictorial information but rather learning to read (and not just only exposure to print) that 
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influences sensitivity to contextual information. The present results raise the question of 
whether previous developmental studies on the Ebbinghaus illusion that showed the largest 
difference between preschool and school years (e.g., Doherty et al., 2010; Hadad, 2018)  were 
indeed tapping into a developmental change instead of a byproduct of an experience-based 
(reading) modulation.  
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General Discussion 
In the present thesis we explored the potential role of learning to read on visual context 
integration and specifically on the Ebbinghaus illusion. To this aim, in two experiments, we 
compared readers and nonreaders (in Experiment 1, uschooled ex-illiterate and schooled literate 
vs. illiterate adults; in Experiment 2, first graders vs. pre-literate preschoolers), in order to 
provide convergent evidence and also to determine if development plays a significant role in 
sensitivity to context independently of literacy acquisition. 
The most important contribution of the present work is that learning to read has a 
significant impact in the influence of visual context in size discrimination. As expected, non-
readers were less sensitive to a misleading (congruent) context than readers, which meant that 
illiterate adults and pre-literate children were less susceptible to the Ebbinghaus illusion than 
observers with reading skills. In Experiment 1, similarly to previous studies with adult groups 
(e.g., Doherty et al., 2008; Phillips et al., 2004), the difference between groups was larger at the 
small size differences. Therefore, illiterate adults were more accurate in size discrimination of 
an inner target surrounded by congruent size inducers (the classic Ebbinghaus illusion) than ex-
illiterate and literate adults. In Experiment 2, pre-literate preschoolers were more accurate in 
size discrimination for the congruent context compared to first graders learning to read, and, 
once again, this was especially evident at smaller real-size differences.  
In both experiments, the influence of context was not symmetrical in the congruent and 
incongruent surroundings. Accordingly with our hypothesis, in Experiment 1, illiterate were 
less accurate in the incongruent context compared to both ex-illiterate and literate adults. This 
was especially evident when the display potentiated the role of context, that is, at smaller real-
size differences between the target and the comparison circle. In Experiment 2, however, 
literacy did not modulate sensitivity to this context: pre-literate preschoolers did not differ from 
first graders overall, nor in any size difference. 
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In a way, this was not surprising, the incongruent context had never been used in another 
experiment at more than 2% size difference, so the incongruent and congruent contexts have 
never been shown to be equivalent counterparts. In fact, both our experiments clearly indicated 
that the congruent and incongruent context are not two sides of the same coin. Sensitivity was 
overall larger to the congruent context: while there was a clear illusion effect for every size 
difference, the effect of the incongruent context was limited to the 2 and 6% size differences. 
This was not due to ceiling effects, given that, while adults did reach a ceiling effect at 10% 
size difference, children did not, yet we found that the incongruent context only had an effect 
at the smaller size-differences in both experiments. Noteworthy, even at these size differences, 
the magnitude of the sensitivity to the incongruent context was reduced considerably compared 
to the magnitude of the sensitivity to the congruent context (see figures 7 and 10). This clearly 
demonstrates that the incongruent context is not an equivalent counterpart of the congruent 
context, which would be the case if size contrast mechanisms were the only ones involved 
(Doherty et al., 2010; Weintraub, 1979). Yet, these contexts did differ, regarding the nature of 
contour interactions taking place. The distance between the inner circle and the outer contours 
of large inducers is always larger in incongruent compared to congruent contexts. Therefore, 
the outer contours of large inducers will have larger expression in the repulsion zone (see Figure 
2A) in incongruent than congruent contexts, and hence, their impact on size estimation of the 
inner circle will be stronger when the inner circle is smaller (incongruent condition) than larger 
(congruent condition). In the same vein, small inducers will be closer to the inner circle when 
this inner circle is larger (incongruent context) than when it is smaller (congruent contexts), so 
the outer contours of small inducers will have larger expression in the attraction zone (Figure 
2A) in the former context, and, hence, their impact on size estimation of the inner circle will be 
stronger in the incongruent compared to the congruent context. Therefore, regardless of the size 
of inducers, the distance between the inner circle and the outer contours depends on congruency 
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of size between inducers and target, which would not be symmetrical in terms of the interaction 
between attraction and repulsion effects. This reveals the challenge of controlling for contour 
interactions when studying the Ebbinghaus illusion, because even when the distance between 
inner contours of inducers and target is controlled, the distance to the outer contours will vary 
depending on the size of target and inducers. It is thus difficult to understand the observation 
of Doherty et al. (2010), who claimed that contour interactions play no part in their results, due 
to their control of the distance between the inner circle and the inner contours of inducers, given 
that outer contours still affected performance. 
In order to examine if factors other than literacy played a role in the susceptibility to the 
Ebbinghaus illusion, we compared the difference in illusion magnitude between readers and 
non-readers in children and adults. However, there are two issues that must be taken into 
account when doing this comparison. Firstly, there might still be influences of cognitive 
development interacting with veridical size perception for children. In fact, our Experiment 2 
suggested this, namely we found a relation between both CPM and Corsi block scores and 
performance on the condition without inducers, which we have interpreted as reflecting the 
immaturity of visuospatial abilities in six-year-old children, so it is not surprising that first 
graders differed from ex-illiterate and literate adults on visual acuity (both ts < -3.7, ps < .001). 
Magnitude measures must be used to control for this. Second, it is not clear if maturation 
influences the susceptibility to the Ebbinghaus illusion in a purely quantitative way, it might 
influence the way in which the illusion affects size discrimination, and not only how much it 
affects size discrimination. Studying these qualitative differences would require the analysis of 
the slope of psychometric functions, which, while out of the scope for the present study, should 
be something to consider in future studies that compare children and adults in the susceptibility 
to the Ebbinghaus illusion.  
Given that literacy effects were strongest at 6% size difference in the congruent context 
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(see figures 7 and 10), we measured the magnitude of sensitivity to the congruent context at 6% 
size difference for the readers in both experiments relative to the non-readers. In Experiment 1, 
relative to illiterate adults, ex-illiterate and literate adults were 27% (SD = .36) and 28% (SD = 
.40) more influenced by the congruent context at this size difference. In Experiment 2, first 
graders were 19% (SD = .38) more influenced by the congruent context at this size difference 
than pre-literate preschoolers. At least numerically, the magnitude of the illusion by child 
readers relative to non-readers is smaller than the one of adult readers relative to illiterate adults. 
This might suggest that, besides literacy acquisition, other factors are also involved in the 
Ebbinghaus illusion, including development. However, given that we did not examine children 
at other ages, we can only speculate whether development, schooling, or other factors could be 
involved. Future studies could consider this possibility .  
The present results agree with previous findings on the impact of literacy in visual 
integration abilities (Szwed et al., 2012). At a neural level, both the Ebbinghaus illusion 
paradigm employed here and the contour integration task employed in Szwed et al. (2012) are 
suggested to depend on long-range connections within V1 that link cells with similar tunning 
preferences (Hadad et al., 2010; Gervan & Kovács, 2010; Kovács, 2000; Kaldy & Kovács, 
2003; Li & Gilbert, 2002; Schwarzkopf et al., 2011; Schwarzkopf & Rees, 2013). Therefore, 
our results, along with the results of Szwed et al. (2012), suggest that literacy can impact early 
visual areas, specifically V1, with changing these long-range connections within V1 through a 
perceptual learning process. It should be noted, however, that there is not direct evidence to 
support that the Ebbinghaus illusion is related with both contour integration and axonal 
plasticity in V1, given that only invasive techniques (i.e. techniques that require surgery) can 
provide a direct look into synaptic connections within V1, but such techniques are not used with 
humans due to ethical considerations. However, a recent study by van Kerkoerle et al. (2018) 
has demonstrated axonal plasticity in V1 following contour integration training in adult 
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macaques using such invasive techniques. One way to provide direct evidence for the links 
between the Ebbinghaus illusion and both contour integration and axonal plasticity in V1 would 
be to test these macaques in the Ebbinghaus illusion during two phases: pre-training and post-
training in the contour integration task. Finding that the Ebbinghaus illusion does increase in 
magnitude after training would provide evidence for a direct association between the 
Ebbinghaus illusion and both contour integration and axonal plasticity in V1. 
The impact of literacy acquisition on early visual processing had already been 
implicated in studies demonstrating that extensive experience with written print iniciates a 
process of perceptual learning that adapts early visual areas to the shapes that compose letters. 
For example, literate adults show increased fMRI activation in V1/V2 for scrambled word 
stimuli in comparison to well-matched scrambled controls on a task that was designed to 
minimize top-down influences (Szwed et al., 2011; 2014). They also show increased fMRI 
activation in the same areas for letters and mached symbols compared to rotated versions of the 
same shapes (Chang et al., 2015). Furthermore, these benefits from perceptual learning are not 
limited to letters, Dehaene et al. (2010) found that literacy enhanced responses in V1 not only 
to written words, but also to horizontal checkerboards presented at the foveal and horizontal 
location in which words are commonly perceived (Rayner, 1998), but not for vertical 
checkerboards. Our study goes beyond this, however, by specifically suggesting that perceptual 
learning, driven by literacy acquisition, impacts the highly plastic horizontal long-range circuits 
of cells within V1 (Gilbert et al., 1996; Kovács et al., 1999; Li & Gilbert, 2002; Li et al., 2004; 
2008; McManus et al., 2011; Schwarzkopf & Kourtzi, 2006). Notably, this impact might occur 
very early during reading acquisition, given that our results demonstrated that literacy effects 
were already very evident in children who still lacked in reading fluency skills. It has been 
shown that literacy impacts late visual areas (e.g. the ventral occipitotemporal cortex) as early 
as two months after reading training (Dehaene-Lambertz et al., 2018), however, the impact on 
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early visual processing has never been tracked across reading acquisition before, our study 
suggests that it also occurs rapidly.  
It should also be further studied if the impact of literacy in early visual processing is 
widespread over the central visual field8, or if, as suggested by Dehaene et al. (2010), it is 
limited to the portions where words are usually read. The reason for this is that our study 
employed stimuli that is perceived differently from the way in which words are perceived. For 
example, while letters are preferentially linked horizontally in order to form words, our central 
circles were always flanked by horizontal, vertical and diagonal contours. Besides, the benefits 
of perceptual learning in one trained portion of the central visual field can transfer to a larger 
untrained portion (Crist et al., 1997; Song et al., 2017), depending on the stimuli and training 
task. One way to study this would be to compare readers and non-readers in different 
Ebbinghaus stimuli where the inducers are presented only horizontally or only vertically. If 
perceptual learning following literacy is restricted to certain portions of the retinotopic cortex 
where words are usually perceived, then, similarly to what Dehaene et al. (2010) found for 
checkerboards, literacy effects should occur only for the Ebbinghaus stimuli in which inducers 
are presented horizontally. 
Our findings also shine some light on the nature of cultural and developmental 
differences found in the susceptibility to the Ebbinghaus illusion. The present results argue 
against an all-encompassing notion of culture, that can, by itself, explain cross-cultural 
differences in perception. Instead, they suggest that the mechanism responsible for these 
cultural changes is not necessarily about culture but about experience-dependent perceptual 
learning, as others have suggested (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2015; Gilbert & Li, 2012; van Kerkoerle 
et al., 2018). Therefore, we argue that literacy acquisition is a relevant micro level cultural 
 
8 It has been shown that the Ebbinghaus illusion is more dependent on cortical magnification in V1 rather than 
absolute anatomical area of V1, which suggest that this illusion is more dependent on central vision rather than 
also depending on foveal vision (Schwarzkopf & Rees, 2013). 
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variable that influences sensitivity to context through perceptual learning. 
Considering the suggestion that this illusion depends on horizontal connections within 
V1 (Kaldy & Kovács, 2003), we suggest that cross-cultural differences in perception occur 
through cultural practices that affect early levels of visual processing. In line with this, Sigman 
et al. (2005) have noted that extensive training on a specific shape (e.g., an inverted T) shifts 
the cortical representation of this learned shape from higher to lower visual areas so that more 
efficient and less effortful processing is achieved. As a consequence, activity also becomes 
progressively reduced in the frontoparietal attentional network (Sigman et al., 2005), denoting 
that processing does become less effortful with perceptual training. Indeed, at least in what 
regards contour integration and V1 functioning, a consistent and extensive literature has shown 
their dependence on perceptual learning and experience-based modulations, both at the lab 
(Kovács et al., 1999; Experiment 2; van Kerkoerle et al., 2018) and in real life (e.g., Szwed et 
al., 2012). Therefore, the coincidence in time between the developmental change found in 
contour integration (Kovács et al., 1999) and an experience-based change, dependent on 
learning to read (Szwed et al., 2012), which, in turn, is known to affect V1 responsiveness to 
visual nonlinguistic categories (Dehaene et al., 2010; Dehaene-Lambertz et al., 2018) is 
unlikely to be by chance.  
Therefore, as we have suggested, the same impact of learning to read is at least one of 
the causes for the developmental turn-point systematically found in the Ebbinghaus illusion 
between 5- and 7-year-old children (e.g., Bremner et al., 2016; Doherty et al., 2010; Hadad et 
al., 2018, Kovács et al., 1999; Weintraub, 1979). Note that this illusion depends on contour 
interactions (e.g., Jaeger, 2015, 1978; Jaeger et al., 2014; Rose & Bressan, 2002; Schwarzkopf 
& Rees, 2013; Todorovic & Jovanovic, 2018) and is underpinned by V1 functioning (e.g., Chen 
et al., 2018; Schwarzkopf & Rees, 2013; Song et al, 2011) and the plexus of horizontal long-
range connections at V1 (Kovács et al., 1999; Li & Gilbert, 2006). Therefore, the present 
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findings that, at the age of six, the magnitude of the Ebbinghaus illusion depends on learning 
to read suggest that what seems to be a developmental change is instead a modulation by 
perceptual learning resulting from the intensive visual activity that is reading (McCandliss, 
Cohen, & Dehaene, 2003). Note that we are not the first to propose that exposure to print is 
relevant for modulations of the Ebbinghaus illusion (Bremner et al., 2016; Doherty et al., 2010). 
Nonetheless, we are the first to show objectively that, from a very early phase of reading 
development (in beginning readers from the 1st-grade), changes induced by learning to read in 
neural underpinnings which also serve visual processing of pattern configurations and which 
are not (at least apparently) related to print can already be visible. We are not arguing that these 
changes can only happen with learning to read, although when not properly controlled (e.g., 
Himba unschooled adults compared with Britsh college students; preschoolers compared to first 
graders), what seems to be due to culture at macro-level or development might rather be 
explained by a micro cultural object as literacy. Instead, what we propose is that the mechanism 
responsible is experience-dependent perceptual learning that taps into the processes involved 
in contour interaction.  
Furthermore, given the large differences between written scrips in Western and some 
East Asian cultures (such as Japanese and Chinese), learning to read in different scripts might 
influence differently the susceptibility to the Ebbinghaus illusion, even if both groups are 
literate. In fact, while the structural characteristics of alphabetic scripts are simple left-right 
linear layouts of letters, the structural characteristics of non-alphabetic scripts, like the Japanese 
(kanji and kana) and Chinese scripts, are complex visual-spatial configurations in a two-
dimensional square. Therefore, learning to read in these latter scripts might place greater 
demands on holistic visuo-spatial processing compared to alphabetic scripts (e.g. Cao, Brennan 
& Booth, 2015), which could, in turn, influence the susceptibility to the Ebbinghaus illusion to 
a greater degree. 
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We hope that, following our study, the role of literacy will be placed in higher 
consideration when contrasting schooled and unschooled groups. Considering our results, this 
is, of course, particularly relevant when considering the Ebbinghaus illusion, but the impact of 
literacy should not be limited to Ebbinghaus stimuli. For example, the Ebbinghaus illusion has 
close ties to the Delboeuf illusion (Delboeuf, 1865; i.e., an optical illusion of size in which two 
identical circles are placed near each other, and one is surrounded by an annulus: the surrounded 
circle appears larger if the annulus is close, but it appears smaller if the annulus is distant; 
Girgus et al., 1972; Girgus & Coren, 1982), and developmental studies on this illusion also do 
not consider the role of literacy, even though the biggest differences are similarly found 
between preschool and school years (e.g. Weintraub & Cooper, 1972). At the limit, the role of 
literacy should be considered for any visual task that relies on visual integration abilites, 
particularly when that visual integration can be carried out by early visual areas.  
In conclusion, we have shown that learning to read impacts the susceptibility to a 
specific visual illusion of size, the Ebbinghaus illusion. This was evident both with adults and 
children. Adult readers, that is, ex-illiterate and literate, were more susceptible to this illusion 
compared to illiterate adults. First-grade children learning to read were also more susceptible 
to this illusion compared to age matched pre-literate preschoolers with the same cognitive 
abilities. Therefore, we suggest that literacy contributes to visual integration abilities, likely 
through strengthening horizontal connections that link cells within the primary visual cortex.  
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